Syracuse University

SURFACE at Syracuse University
Dissertations - ALL

SURFACE at Syracuse University

Spring 5-23-2021

As a Matter De Facto: State Capacity Dynamics and Their Role in
Shaping Sovereignty for Unrecognized States
Angely Martinez
Syracuse University

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/etd
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Martinez, Angely, "As a Matter De Facto: State Capacity Dynamics and Their Role in Shaping Sovereignty
for Unrecognized States" (2021). Dissertations - ALL. 1430.
https://surface.syr.edu/etd/1430

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the SURFACE at Syracuse University at SURFACE at
Syracuse University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations - ALL by an authorized administrator of
SURFACE at Syracuse University. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu.

Abstract
What explains de facto states that do not pursue statehood? Why do we see examples of
unrecognized states pushing for reintegration after a period of time? Why do some de facto states
seem content with the status quo?
Previous examination of de facto state strategies highlighted the role that the international
system plays in granting independence. For the most part, de facto states, by default secessionist
movements who have sundered from the parent state, are unlikely to be granted independence by
the very system which holds a taboo against secession. The exceptions to this came after a long
time of sustained campaigning, in addition to gross human rights violations. Current explanations
for de facto states still in limbo hedge on other states playing the most important role. These
explanations are incomplete. For de facto states that have signaled their desire for reintegration
or the states, it is useful to examine not only internal dynamics within the unrecognized state, but
also the de facto state – parent state dynamic.
In this dissertation, I analyze the role that relative state capacity plays in shaping
preferences for de facto states, whether that be for reintegration, status quo, or independence. My
dissertation contributes to the burgeoning literature on de facto statehood in a variety of ways.
First, I contribute by challenging the idea that unrecognized states automatically prefer
independence. My case studies point to a variety of preferences that exist along the spectrum of
de facto states. Northern Cyprus shows an example of an established de facto state that pushed
for reintegration with the very parent state that assured it did not have a role in the international
system. The case of Taiwan displays an example of an economic powerhouse that treads the line
of status quo acceptance, and the role that their state capacity relative to the parent state plays in

0

that. Finally, Somaliland is a case of a de facto state preferring independence, despite having no
patron state and an uphill climb to establish adequate state building.
Second, I present a theoretical framework that incorporates state capacity of the de facto
state and the parent state. Specifically, I lay out that the balance of state capacity between both
parties shapes preferences for either reintegration, status quo, or independence. Furthermore,
state capacity is dissected down into three constituent parts: military capacity, economic
capacity, and administrative capacity. I directly compare the military, economic, and
administrative capacity of each de facto-parent state dyad, using numerous indicators. By
systematically comparing the state capacity of de facto states and parent states, my dissertation
offers an additional and necessary examination into de facto states and their outlook towards
their sovereignty.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
My primary research focus centers around de facto states (also called unrecognized
states). De facto states are areas that have declared independence from a central government, but
do not hold international recognition. All were preceded by a civil war, or an insurgency, where
the “rebels” held on to territory after the conflict came to an end. Some examples of de facto
states include Taiwan, Northern Cyprus, Somaliland, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and
Transnistria. De facto states may be rare on the international stage, but their importance can
inform questions on overarching big picture concepts, such as democracy, great power
competition, the future of secessionist movements, and counterterrorism, to name a few.
The expectation is that de facto states will vie for statehood. If this is the case, why
do we see examples of de facto states not vying for statehood? What made Northern Cyprus
agree to a plan that would create a federated state with Cyprus? Why does Taiwan practice a
policy of deliberate ambiguity, which aims to keep the status quo as long as possible? Why has
Somaliland pursued independence, despite no patron? My central question is: Under what
conditions do de facto states choose to forgo statehood? This can be broken down into two
separate categories:

1) Under what conditions do de facto states seek reintegration?
2) Under what conditions do de facto states seek the status quo?

I use state capacity as my main independent variable. Ceteris paribus, higher state
capacity means that the territory in question is strong in military capacity, economic capacity,
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and administrative function. My theory posits that if a de facto state is stronger than a parent
state, taking all types of state capacity into account, pursuing statehood is a likely strategy. The
de facto state has reason to push for recognition. If the parent state is comparatively stronger than
a de facto state, reintegration is a likely strategy. The de facto state may realize that further
conflict and isolation is likely if they continue to grow weaker than the parent state, and may be
open to the idea of autonomy within the old state, instead of continuing to hold out for an
unlikely scenario. If they are relatively equal, status quo is the most likely strategy for the time
being.
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive comparison of state
capacity between three dyads of de facto state – parent state. It seeks to advance knowledge in
the field by directly comparing measurements of state capacity between de facto states and their
respective parent. Previous studies have mapped out the state capacity of existing de facto states,
and have, to some extent, measured this against the parent state, but this has mostly focused on
military power. I seek to expand beyond a measure of military capacity. My project seeks to give
a comparison across three dimensions of state capacity: military capacity, economic capacity,
and administrative capacity. In doing this, I look to provide examples of de facto states that do
not pursue independence and look to answer the question: under what conditions do
unrecognized states forgo independence? The theory rests on the hypothesis that de facto states
that do not have relatively higher state capacity that their parent state cannot afford to pursue
independence due to capacity constraints, therefore their strategies will differ. That lower
capacity states would not automatically consider independence is not as obvious as it might seem
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at first glance. For example, Horowitz notes that some states pursue independence even when
they are weak(er) and likely to be worse off afterwards.1
To do this, I employ three cases. The first case, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(TRNC, hereafter referred to as Northern Cyprus), presents a situation in which the de facto state
has a lower state capacity compared to the parent state (the Republic of Cyprus). This chapter
examines and compares the state capacity of both across three dimensions. Northern Cyprus’
lower state capacity can be viewed as one of many reasons why the population, and subsequent
elected leaders, chose to support reunification with the Republic of Cyprus in 2004 (the Greek
Cypriots did not vote for reunification, so this was not implemented). The second case, Taiwan,
or the Republic of China, presents a situation of continuing the status quo. Taiwan’s current
standing when compared to the People’s Republic of China is tricky to measure, especially in
light of China’s rising power and influence on the world stage. However, when it comes to
strictly domestic state capacity comparisons, Taiwan is neither stronger nor weaker than China,
for now. The third case is the unrecognized case of Somaliland. Here, the purpose of this chapter
is to give an example of a “typical” de facto state, where the territory in question seeks to
advance its cause for independence.2 In all state capacity measures, Somaliland beats out the
parent state, Somalia.
I use the three mentioned case studies for a variety of reasons. First, the universe of de
facto states is small, and the number of agreed upon number of de facto states is controversial,
with the numbers ranging from six to thirty-four potential cases. The cases selected are popularly
agreed upon cases within the de facto state universe, and the puzzle of interest lies within these

1

Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (University of California Press, 1985).
I use “typical” to refer to the perception that a de facto state, which begins as a secessionist conflict, will
likely continue its quest to pursue international recognition.
2
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cases to better explain the overall phenomenon of forgoing statehood 3. Second, they are
relatively long lasting, and are not in an active conflict phase. Northern Cyprus was separated
from the south in 1974 and declared independence in 1983. Taiwan lost its United Nations seat
in 1971. Somaliland became a de facto state in 1991. This means that the three cases are between
30 and 50 years, which provides enough time to track the development of the de facto state.
The order of the dissertation proceeds as follows. The rest of this chapter will introduce
the concept of de facto states, what they are, and how they matter. Chapter 2, the theory chapter,
lays out existing literature in the subfield of de facto states, as well as how the notion of state
capacity is conceived of in political science. I then delve into my research design, namely: my
rationale for case selection, external validity, and data collection. Then, I propose my hypothesis
and model, which seeks to answer the question: Under what conditions do de facto states forgo
statehood? My model, a simple diagram, lays this out in a clear and concise manner. I expect de
facto states with a lower state capacity than the parent state to forgo independence in favor of
reunification. This is the case of Northern Cyprus, where the 2004 referendum for reunification
of the island, also known as the Annan Plan (after the UN Secretary General) represents a clear
mandate for reunification with the Republic of Cyprus. The next part of the diagram corresponds
to de facto states looking to maintain the status quo, such as Taiwan. In this case, the expectation
is for relatively equal state capacities between the de facto state and parent state. In other words,
neither one has an overwhelming advantage or disadvantage at this point in time. Finally, the
third leg of the diagram is when the de facto states have an advantage over the parent state in

3

Jason Seawright and John Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research,” Political
Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (June 9, 2008): 294–308, https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907313077, p.
299.
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regard to state capacity—in other words, is stronger. Here I use the case of Somaliland and
Somalia.
The rest of the theory chapter proceeds to break down the concept of state capacity. In
this dissertation, state capacity is not merely one concept, but is broken down into three separate
facets: military capacity, economic capacity, and administrative capacity. Military capacity
measures the (de facto) state’s ability to control territory, the monopoly on violence, and provide
security to its population. For de facto states, a premium is placed on military capacity. After all,
as unrecognized states, their ability to exist rests depends on how long they control territory.
Economic capacity is the second category, and it measures the states’ ability to collect revenue
and fund the necessary state functions. Administrative capacity looks to examine the presence
and quality of government institutions that serve the population. Additionally, I explain the role
of patron states, who are crucial in bolstering the state capacity of de facto states. Patron states
mostly issue support militarily and economically, making them vital in measuring state capacity.
After the state capacity breakdown, I introduce alternative explanations. Alternative explanations
for de facto state preferences include identity arguments, as well as international system factors.
Finally, I close out the theory chapter by summarizing the main points.
In chapter 3, the discussion centers around the first case study, Northern Cyprus. The
overwhelming vote for the Annan Plan in 2004 makes it clear that reintegration was the preferred
option for the general population and the political leaders. Could the relative state capacity
between Northern Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus played a role? The evidence shows that
despite Northern Cyprus’ military superiority (largely due to Turkey’s patronage), residents in
the north on average had a lower economic and administrative capacity outlook than neighbors to
the south of the island. While the Republic of Cyprus slid into high-income territory, Turkish
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Cypriots had a middling island economy at best. Compounded by this was the fact that the
south’s decades-long embargo meant that Northern Cyprus had to reroute all trade through
Turkey and rely on the tourism and education sectors. Furthermore, with Turkey the only state
recognizing Northern Cyprus, it took many years to build relationships with other states. Adding
to the mix was the enticement of joining the European Union, which had already been promised
the Greek Cypriots. This created the perfect environment for Turkish Cypriots to cast their vote
for a plan that would have reunited the island under one flag. The referendum did not pass due to
the clear rejection by the Greek Cypriot portion of the island, but it represented a watershed
moment in the history of the de facto state.
Chapter 4 focuses on the case of Taiwan, and the current strategy to keep within the status
quo. While Taiwan is currently recognized by seventeen countries, scholars of the field still refer
to it as a de facto state, though often with an asterisk. Military, Taiwan stays afloat and barely at
parity with China only with the aid of the United States, but this could change in the future. Once
again, Taiwan is able to maintain military might due to promises and aid from its patron, the
United States. For economic and administrative capacity, China’s larger economy means it more
to draw from, but Taiwan wins out in most quality-of-life indicators. Unlike other de facto states
that struggle to be recognized by other countries, Taiwan boasts embassies in several states
around the world, as well as consulates where it is not officially recognized. However, China has
recently been successful in its derecognition campaign, already convincing several states to
switch allegiances from Taiwan to China. I posit that Taiwan’s status quo strategy stems from
the desire to both assert independence and a different way of life from the People’s Republic of
China, while also taking note of the fact that a declaration of independence would inflame the
already tense situation over Taiwan’s status. China repeatedly asserted its intention to bring
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Taiwan into the fold, peacefully or otherwise. While past Taiwanese leaders differed in their
desired closeness to its neighbors across the Strait, it was all within the bounds of maintaining
Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty.
In chapter 5, I examine the case of Somaliland, which unlike the previous two case studies, is
pursuing independence despite its unrecognized status. Somaliland’s pursuit of independence
stands in stark contrast to Northern Cyprus’ 2004 vote, or to Taiwan’s balancing act of status
quo. The theory I propose states that de facto states with higher relative state capacity to the
parent state are more likely to pursue independence, as opposed to reintegration, status quo, or
another strategy. In terms of state capacity, Somaliland outshines Somalia in military, economic,
and administrative terms. This is made more remarkable by the fact that unlike many de facto
states, Somaliland has no patron. Somaliland, despite little help from other states and donors, has
built a secure haven in the Horn of Africa region, battling both Al-Shabaab and piracy off the
coast. The first decade post conflict was spent ensuring this security, but recent developments
have improved government institutions in Somaliland, as well as the economic outlook of the
territory. Comparatively, Somalia still battles with the most essential of government functions—
securing territory and protecting populations. Despite aid from the international community,
Somalia is frequently categorized as a “failed state”. It is not surprising that that Somaliland has
easily surpassed Somalia in nearly all measures of state building and effectiveness.
Finally, chapter 6 concludes this dissertation. Here, I recap the previous chapters, lay out the
argument, and summarize the evidence. After, I pose policy considerations for both American
and international stakeholders, focusing on the future of unrecognized states, especially
considering their longevity, stability, and governance institutions. I also point to future areas of
concern, notably Northern Cyprus’s role in the Eastern Mediterranean oil crisis, Taiwan’s future
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in light of China’s ascent, and what the United States may play in this tense situation.
Somaliland’s future, while not set in stone, seems on the up and up, and I consider what
implications this could have on its recognition status. While few de facto states make the jump to
recognized statehood, the last two have been on the African continent: Eritrea, and South Sudan.
With Somaliland having a different colonial history than its parent state, Somalia, could it be the
next de facto state to receive recognition?

Why do De Facto States Matter?
Policymakers may look at the problem of de facto states and decide that they are simply
frozen conflicts with little possibility for resolution. At first glance, this assumption seems to be
correct. However, I argue that de facto states pose far more value than their current reputation
gives away.
For one, de facto states have impressive democratization efforts. Trying to vie for
legitimacy and curry favor, especially from the West, some de facto states have figured out that
building democratic institutions is one way to do that. Below, I present visualizations of Freedom
House scores, which track political rights and civil liberties. The charts compare the Freedom
House scores between the parent state and the de facto state. It is worth noting that Freedom
House tracks political and civil liberties on a 1 to 7 scale, with one being the freest, and 7 being
the least free. The categorical ranges are: “Free”, “Partly Free”, and “Not Free”, which overall
corresponds to the most amount of political and civil liberties, some political and civil liberties,
and little to no political civil liberties.

9
For the time period between 2002-2019, Northern Cyprus maintained a “Free” rating
from Freedom House, due to its democratic multiparty system, and respect for civil liberties.4
The case of Northern Cyprus is another example of successful democratic institutions being
established on a de facto state. Northern Cyprus maintains a “Free” rating throughout, only
scoring slightly worse that its parent state Cyprus, which also managed a “Free” rating.
In 2/3 of the above cases, the de facto state boasted higher Freedom House scores, which
measures political and civil liberties specifically. For Taiwan and China, the differences are
stark, with Taiwan showing all the trappings of a democracy, and consistently being rated as
“Free”. China, in contrast, is consistently rated “Not Free”, and receives the second lowest score
available. In the case of Somaliland and Somalia, Somaliland has consistently achieved a “Partly
Free” rating since Freedom House began reporting on the unrecognized state, which denotes
some political and civil liberties are present, although there is still work to be done to achieve a
“Free” rating. Somalia is rated as “Not Free” throughout, and the lack of authority and rights
means that it receives the lowest score available.

4

Freedom House, “Northern Cyprus Country
Report”, https://web.archive.org/web/20200828014335/https://freedomhouse.org/country/northerncyprus/freedom-world/2019.
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Table 1.1: Northern Cyprus and Cyprus Freedom House Scores5
Year N. Cyprus
Score
2019 2.0
2018 2.0
2017 2.0
2016 2.0
2015 2.0
2014 2.0
2013 2.0
2012 2.0
2011 2.0
2010 2.0
2009 2.0
2008 2.0
2007 2.0
2006 2.0
2005 2.0
2004 2.0
2003 2.0
2002 2.0

5 5

N. Cyprus
Description
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free

Cyprus
Score
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

Cyprus
Description
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free

Freedom House scoring ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 being the freest, and 7 being the least free.
Freedom House, “Northern Cyprus Country Report,”
2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20200828014335/https://freedomhouse.org/country/northerncyprus/freedom-world/2019; Freedom House, “Cyprus,”
2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20200828013338/https://freedomhouse.org/country/cyprus/freedomworld/2019.
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Table 1.2: Taiwan and China Freedom House Scores6
Year Taiwan
Score
2019 1.0
2018 1.0
2017 1.0
2016 1.5
2015 1.5
2014 1.5
2013 1.5
2012 1.5
2011 1.5
2010 1.5
2009 1.5
2008 1.5
2007 1.5
2006 1.0
2005 1.5
2004 2.0
2003 2.0
2002 1.5
2001 1.5
1999 2.0

6

Taiwan
Description
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free
Free

China
Score
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5
6.5

China
Description
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free

Scores not available for the year 2000. Freedom House, “Taiwan Country Report,”
2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20200828014006/https://freedomhouse.org/country/taiwan/freedomworld/2019; Freedom House, “China Country Report,”
2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20200828013009/https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedomworld/2019.
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Table 1.3: Somaliland and Somalia Freedom House Scores7
Year Somaliland
Score
2019 4.5
2018 4.5
2017 5.0
2016 5.0
2015 4.5
2014 4.5
2013 4.5
2012 4.5
2011 4.5
2010 5.0
2009 4.5

Somaliland
Description
Partly Free
Partly Free
Partly Free
Partly Free
Partly Free
Partly Free
Partly Free
Partly Free
Partly Free
Partly Free
Partly Free

Somalia
Score
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0

Somalia
Description
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free

Another reason that policymakers should look to de facto states is that, for the most part,
they are relatively stable and high functioning. Northern Cyprus, despite being unsuccessful in
joining the European Union, is relatively stable as an unrecognized state. Despite its close
proximity to Turkey and the Middle East, Northern Cyprus has not faced massive refugee
problems or terrorism. Taiwan, one of the four “Asian Tigers”, boasts an impressive economy
and political freedom despite tensions with China. Somaliland has managed to be a bastion
against Al-Shabab and piracy, despite the terrorist group ravaging Somalia, and piracy being a

7

Scores for Somaliland from 1999-2008 are not available. Freedom House, “Somaliland Country
Report,”
2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20200828012703/https://freedomhouse.org/country/somaliland/freedo
m-world/2019; Freedom House, “Somalia Country Report,”
2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20200828012703/https://freedomhouse.org/country/somaliland/freedo
m-world/2019.
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major issue along the Somali coast.8 Additionally, other states in the Horn of Africa, such as
Djibouti and Ethiopia, rely on Somaliland for stability and security.9
While it is difficult to say whether democratization and longstanding stability alone
warrant recognition, policymakers and leaders should at least consider engaging more with de
facto states, for the purposes of conflict resolution, or even issues unrelated to recognition.10 A
new strand of the de facto state literature studies this exact phenomenon. “Engagement without
recognition” is the idea that states can engage with de facto states on various topics without
extending recognition.11 The concept of recognition being so tense and political, this may be a
favorable outcome for both parties.
The concept of “engagement without recognition” was first used in academic literature by
Cooley and Mitchell in 2010.12 They devised it as a strategy that could be employed by the West
(the United States and the European Union) towards Abkhazia specifically, and Eurasian de facto
states in general, in order to counter Russian influence. However, the concept of “engagement
without recognition” has been extended by other scholars since then. Berg and Pegg find that the

8

Mark Kirk, “Ending Somali Piracy Against American and Allied Shipping,”
2011, https://web.archive.org/web/20200828012847/http://piracyreport.com/downloads/kirk.senate.gov_p
dfs_KirkReportfinal2.pdf; Eiki Berg and Scott Pegg, “Scrutinizing a Policy of ‘Engagement Without
Recognition’: US Requests for Diplomatic Actions With De Facto States,” Foreign Policy Analysis 14,
no. 3 (2016): p. 396, https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orw044; Michael Rubin, “U.S. Africa Policy Cannot
Afford to Ignore Somaliland,” The National Interest, February 26,
2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20200628213849/https://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-africa-policycannot-afford-ignore-somaliland-45657.
9
Berg and Pegg, “Scrutinizing a Policy of ‘Engagement Without Recognition’: US Requests for
Diplomatic Actions With De Facto States.”, p. 396.
10
James Ker-Lindsay, “Engagement without Recognition: The Limits of Diplomatic Interaction with
Contested States,” International Affairs 91, no. 2 (2015): pp. 1–16, https://doi.org/10.1111/14682346.12234.
11
Alexander Cooley and Lincoln A. Mitchell, “Engagement without Recognition: A New Strategy toward
Abkhazia and Eurasia’s Unrecognized States,” Washington Quarterly 33, no. 4 (2010): pp. 59–73,
https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2010.516183.
12
This last part is crucial. The purpose of “engagement without recognition” is that states can interact
with de facto states on political, economic, social, and cultural issues, while making it clear that an
independent status will never be accepted. Cooley and Mitchell, p. 60.
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United States has practiced “engagement without recognition” with various de facto states,
specifically the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Somaliland.13 U.S. officials engaged
with de facto state officials in Northern Cyprus following the Annan Plan vote, and with
Somaliland officials following the 2008-2010 presidential election crisis.14 Somaliland is also an
important partner against terrorism and piracy in the region, and by engaging with Somaliland,
the U.S. helps aid progress in the region.
As to why the U.S. (and the West in general, it could be argued) practices “engagement
without recognition”, the reasons can be divided into at least two camps: democratization and
promoting moderate leaders. In the case of Somaliland, the U.S. wanted to ensure continued
democratization and peaceful transfer of power in the region following postponed elections.15 In
Northern Cyprus, the U.S. was keen to support the moderate Republican Turkish Party (CTP,
Turkish: Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi), whose leader, Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat, was prosolution (reunification). In the same vein, the U.S. wanted Turkish Cypriots not only to embrace
the moderate pro-solution party, but to eschew former President Denktaş’s rejectionism. All in
all, “engagement without recognition” seems to be a practical way for policymakers to work with
de facto states, who are usually relegated to the sidelines of the international system. While not
endorsing secession, “engagement without recognition” allows other problems to be worked on
without the need for recognition.

13

Berg and Pegg, “Scrutinizing a Policy of ‘Engagement Without Recognition’: US Requests for
Diplomatic Actions With De Facto States.”p. 394.
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What Are De Facto States and How Many Exist?
The study of de facto states began definitively in 1998, with the publication of Scott
Pegg’s International Society and the De Facto State. More than twenty years later, there has been
much more scholarly contribution to the subfield, but many areas remain unexplored. One of the
central arguments in the subfield remains how to define de facto statehood, and which entities
qualify as such.
Pegg defines de facto states as “secessionist entities that control territory, provide
governance, receive popular support, and persisted for extended periods of time without
widespread recognition.16 Another way to define de facto states would be to use the criteria set
forth by the Montevideo Convention of 1933. The treaty codifies the definition of statehood
under international law. Under it, a state is defined as having: (a) a permanent population; (b) a
defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.17
De facto states should meet these four criteria and lack international recognition to be considered
as such. 18
Another way to conceive of these entities is to note that de facto states meet the criteria of
statehood, but do not possess legal recognition, or de jure statehood. De jure statehood, or
juridical statehood, refers to the legal recognition of a state by other states, while de facto
statehood, or empirical statehood, refers to fulfilling the roles and actions of a state.19 By
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Scott Pegg, “Twenty Years of de Facto State Studies: Progress, Problems, and Prospects,” Oxford
Research Encyclopedia of Politics, 2017, p. 2.
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violating de jure borders, while also seeking to exhibit the appearance and behaviors of a state,
de facto states pose a paradox and anomaly to the international system that is dominated by
sovereign states.20 Figure 1.1, below, places territories according to their empirical and juridical
statehoods. Recognized states that fulfill the role of the state, such as the Republic of Cyprus and
China, go into the top left box. Recognized states that do not fulfill the role of the state,
otherwise known as failed states, go into the bottom left box, like Somalia. De facto states, which
do not possess juridical statehood but do have empirical statehood, go into the top right box.
Entities with no juridical or empirical statehood are likely not viable and beyond the scope of this
project.
Figure 1.1: Empirical vs. Juridical Statehood21
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Based on Jackson and Rosberg 1982 criteria.
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Pegg’s definition of de facto statehood may have been the first but was certainly not the last
definition put forth. Caspersen posits that in order to be considered a de facto state, the entity
must “control at least two-thirds of the territory they claim, including the territory’s main city
and key regions”.22 Byman and King suggest that there must be a shared interest for
independence, which would disqualify groups merely seeking more autonomy.23 Florea’s
definition has seven criteria.24
1. Belongs to a recognized country under international law, but not a colony
2. Has declared independence or demonstrated willingness for independence through a
referendum or similar action
3. Exerts military control over a territory that has a permanent population
4. Is not sanctioned by the government
5. Performs basic government duties (empirical statehood)
6. Lacks international recognition
7. Exists for at least 2 years

It is also important to delineate what a de facto state is not. It is not an autonomous region
in a federation, such as Catalonia. While it can be argued that Catalonia (and other autonomous
regions) possesses an interest in independence, it does not operate separately as a state, and is in
fact still very much a part of Spain. Autonomous regions within a state cannot be classified as de
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Notably, this would eliminate Western Sahara, which only controls about fifteen percent of the territory
they claim. Nina Caspersen, Unrecognized States: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Modern
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(August 2012): pp. 43–57, p. 45.
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facto states because they still function within the confines of the original state. Other instances,
like anti-government rebels such also do not qualify for de facto statehood because while antigovernment rebels in various states may hold territory, their goal is to overthrow the existing
government, not create a newly independent state.25 If a de facto state is successful in its
creation, there will be two territories where there was once one.
While the various definitions of de facto statehood are fairly similar, scholars have a
more difficult time agreeing to how many exist, and Table 1.4 below illustrates this. At the low
end, Kolstø and Paukovic count a dozen, with six still currently in existence.26 Caspersen counts
fifteen, plus the two borderline cases of Kosovo and Taiwan.27 Florea counts thirty-four, with
eighteen surviving until the end of 2011 (when the dataset ends). While this debate is contentious
and ongoing, for the purposes of this dissertation I will use Florea’s definition of a de facto state.
Florea’s definition allows for a greater number of cases, which is useful in examining internal
dynamics of these entities. Furthermore, his definition includes specific examples of what does
not constitute a de facto state, which addresses questions about boundaries and delineation. To
further expand on how scholars of de facto states count the universe of cases, Tables 1.5 – 1.8
show where they agree and diverge on what is considered a de facto state. Furthermore, each
table corresponds to the type of de facto state. Table 1.5 focuses on former de facto states that
were forcefully reintegrated back into the de facto state. Table 1.6 focuses on former de facto
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Florea, p. 792.
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states that agreed to reintegrate. Table 1.7 is the list of de facto states currently in existence.
Finally, Table 1.8 lists former de facto states that were granted statehood.

Table 1.4: Number of De Facto States, by Scholar
Scholar and Year
Kolstø and Paukovic (2014)
Caspersen (2012)
Florea (2014)

Number of Total De Facto States
12
15 + 2 borderline
34

Table 1.5: Former De Facto States with Forceful Reintegration 28
Katanga
Biafra
Krajina
Chechnya
Anjouan
Tamil Eelam

Kolstø and Paukovic, Florea
Kolstø and Paukovic, Florea
Caspersen, Florea
Kolstø and Paukovic, Caspersen,
Florea
Florea
Kolstø and Paukovic, Caspersen,
Florea

Table 1.6: Former De Facto States with Peaceful Reintegration29
Rwenzururu Kingdom
Gagauzia
Bougainville30
Eastern Slavonia
Ajaria
Aceh

28

Florea
Caspersen, Florea
Caspersen, Florea
Florea
Florea
Florea

Florea, “De Facto States in International Politics (1945-2011): A New Data Set.”, p. 793.
Peaceful reintegration denotes a peace agreements or mutual agreement by both the de facto state and
parent state to reintegrate. It does not mean the independence movement itself was peaceful.
30
In 2019, Bougainville voted overwhelmingly for independence in a non-binding referendum mandated
by the peace agreement. Therefore, it is likely that Bougainville will move from this category into one
that denotes having achieved independence.
29
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Table 1.7: Current De Facto States
Karen State
Kachin State
Taiwan
Mindanao
Northern Cyprus
Western Sahara
Cabinda
Casamance
Abkhazia
Kurdistan
Nagorno-Karabakh
Puntland
Somaliland
South Ossetia
Transnistria
Republika Srpska
Palestine
Gaza

Florea
Florea
Caspersen31, Florea
Florea
Kolstø and Paukovic, Caspersen,
Florea
Florea
Florea
Florea
Kolstø and Paukovic, Caspersen,
Florea
Caspersen, Florea
Caspersen, Florea
Florea
Kolstø and Paukovic, Caspersen,
Florea
Kolstø and Paukovic, Caspersen,
Florea
Kolstø and Paukovic, Caspersen,
Florea
Kolstø and Paukovic, Caspersen,
Florea
Florea
Florea

Table 1.8: Former De Facto States, Now Independent States
Eritrea
East Timor
Montenegro
Kosovo
South Sudan

31
32

Borderline.
Borderline.

Caspersen, Florea
Florea
Caspersen
Caspersen32, Florea
Florea
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Project Overview
In 2004, Turkish Cypriots voted overwhelmingly to become a federal state with their
Greek Cypriot counterparts. In 2020, the area known as Somaliland marked its 29th year of
declared independence from Somalia, but the issue of sovereign statehood has not yet been
resolved. In early 2020, Taiwan voted overwhelmingly to elect reelect a pro-independence
candidate, even though a declaration of independence seems unlikely anytime soon. What do all
of these areas have in common? At one point, they all declared independence from their country
or established a separate government. They were states without recognition, otherwise known as
de facto states, or unrecognized states. The trajectories of the de facto states listed above
however, are very different. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine these varied
trajectories, using relative state capacity of the de facto state and parent state to explain one part
of the puzzle.
This project examines strategies of de facto states by asking the question: Under what
conditions do de facto states forgo independence? The puzzle here concerns the expectation that
de facto states will vie for statehood versus the reality of foregoing statehood in certain
situations. Moreover, what explains the variations in goals for de facto states, noting that
foregoing independence is just one of the outcomes? Having already been severed and sundered
from the principle state, de facto states are alone and often marginalized by the international
community. One would think that the benefits of statehood and recognition means that de facto
states work tirelessly to try to be recognized. However, we see very specific instances of de facto
states deliberately choosing either reintegration to the parent state, or continued status quo in the
face of public support for independence. Specifically, I look at the case of Northern Cyprus in
the run-up to the Annan Plan vote in 2004, where the public and the center-left opposition
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mounted a successful campaign and voted to reintegrate with the Republic of Cyprus. I also look
at Taiwan, which practices a policy of “deliberate ambiguity” that seeks to keep the status quo as
long as possible, despite support to declare independence. Additionally, I examine the case of
Somaliland, which serves as a “typical” case study, where the de facto state continues to push for
independence.33 Each de facto state has a corresponding parent state, as seen in Table 1.4. For
Northern Cyprus, the parent state is the Republic of Cyprus, for Taiwan, the parent state is
China, and for Somaliland, the parent state is Somalia.

Table 1.9: De Facto States and Parent States
De Facto State
Northern
Cyprus
Taiwan
Somaliland

Parent State
Republic of
Cyprus
China
Somalia

In cases where original demands for statehood can change to other preferences, what are
the underlying conditions that explain their strategy? I theorize that an important explanation for
these deviations from the expected strategy lies in the relative level of state capacity between the
de facto state and the parent state. Namely, an unequal balance in favor of the parent state would
make it more likely that the de facto state favors reintegration (Northern Cyprus), while an
unequal balance in favor of the de facto state would make it more likely that the de facto state
favors independence (Somaliland). A relatively equal balance, as in the case of Taiwan, would
favor a strategy of keeping the status quo.

33

Interestingly, of the three proposed cases, Somaliland is the only de facto state without a patron, yet is
the only one of the three to be ardently pro-independence.
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Chapter 2: Theory
Under what conditions do de facto states forego the pursuit of statehood? This is the main
question I tackle in this dissertation. This puzzle exists because de facto states are at their core,
secessionist movements that managed to successfully deter their parent state, and control
territory and populations (for at least two years). Most de facto state births are the result of civil
conflict: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Cyprus, Taiwan, and
Somaliland are just a few examples where conflict preceded separation.34 We would expect these
entities to continue to push for independence for various reasons. First, the benefits of statehood
are high. The exclusive club of states comes with perks like trade within the international system,
and a (somewhat) stable norm of sovereignty. Second, independence would bring a final
dissolution from the parent state, where tensions usually remain from a painful past. In the
Georgian de facto states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both allege grievances of ethnic
cleansing. Somaliland points to the atrocities committed by the Barre regime to justify their
separation. Northern Cyprus harkens back to the mid 20th century, where the Greek majority
disenfranchised their Turkish counterparts on the island. Despite these examples, some of these
very de facto states have changed preferences over time, and independence is no longer the
short-term goal. Why does this occur? Using comparative state capacity, this is what I attempt to
answer in this dissertation.
I use three cases of comparison to illustrate various scenarios. The first empirical chapter
looks at the case of Northern Cyprus and their vote to reintegrate with the Republic of Cyprus.
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For further reading on secessionist movements and tactics against home state rule, see: Ryan Griffiths,
The Sovereignty Game: Secessionist Strategy and Tactics in the International System (Cornell University
Press, 2021). Specifically, one type of secessionist movement that Griffiths notes concerns de facto states,
who rely on their governance and functionality to attempt to convince the international system for
independence, since the parent state is closed off to them.
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The second case looks at Taiwan and seeks to answer why they continue a strategy of pursuing
the status quo as long as possible, despite public and political support for independence. The
third empirical chapter looks at the de facto case of Somaliland. This case will serve as a
“traditional” de facto case, in which Somaliland continues to push for independence on the world
stage.
My contribution to the literature is twofold. First, I bring the state capacity literature and
apply it to unrecognized states. Second, by comparing unrecognized states and their parent states,
I can more effectively measure indicators of military power, economic growth, and
administrative capacity. This dissertation builds on Seymour’s 2008 dissertation, where he
proposes a framework for outcomes of separatist conflicts resulting in autonomy, de facto
statehood, or statehood.35 I use a similar categorization of my cases, although I do not measure
outcomes, since all three of my cases are currently “frozen” in de facto statehood. Ultimately, the
results of a secessionist movement are determined in large part by international politics, not
merely separatist desires.36 In addition, I use Florea’s dataset “De Facto States in International
Politics” to set the framework for measuring state capacity in de facto states.37 With my research,
my goal is to supplement and add to the existing measures on de facto states.
I argue that relative state capacity makes it more probable that a de facto state will choose
to pursue statehood, reintegration, or the status quo. Essentially, the balance of total state
capacity from the parent state vs. the de facto state will play a part in what is feasible for the de
facto state to pursue and whether their preferences change from statehood. For a de facto state
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Lee Seymour, “Pathways to Secession: Mapping the Institutional Effects of Conflicts of SelfDetermination” (Northwestern University, 2008), p. 65.
36
Donald L. Horowitz, “Patterns of Ethnic Separatism,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 23,
no. 2 (1981): pp. 165–95, p. 167, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417500013268.
37
Florea, “De Facto States in International Politics (1945-2011): A New Data Set.”

25
much stronger than the parent state, the obvious choice would be to keep pursuing independence,
and keep trying to gain support on the international stage. An example of this is Somaliland.
Somaliland, as a de facto state, boasts higher state capacity than its parent state, Somalia. A case
of de facto state reintegration is Northern Cyprus. Northern Cyprus voted to become a federal
state with the Republic of Cyprus in 2004. I argue this is partly due to unequal levels of state
capacity, with the Republic of Cyprus coming out on top. Finally, a case of status quo would be
Taiwan. Taiwan, while being recognized by 18 nations (as of 2019), has kept a strategy of
“deliberate ambiguity.” With China and the United States as the parent state and patron state
respectively, Taiwan is caught in the middle of great power politics and risks an escalating
conflict should it push aggressively for independence. At the same time, Taiwan is loath to
become a part of China, whether it be under the Hong Kong Model (“One Country Two
Systems”), or direct reintegration.
The model below illustrates my theory in a simple manner. When relative state capacity
favors the de facto state, I expect the push for statehood to remain the core message. When
relative state capacity favors the parent state, I expect this push for statehood to go away, and
instead have it replaced for a reintegration preference. Finally, when state capacity capability is
relatively equal, that is, does not favor one or the other decisively, I expect the status quo
position to be championed by the de facto state. As I specify in the sections following, state
capacity is dissected into its parts.
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Figure 2.1: State Capacity Theory for De Facto States
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State Capacity Definition
For this dissertation, I will employ a narrow definition of state capacity: “the ability of
state institutions to effectively implement official goals”.38 As a concept, state capacity suffers
from numerous issues, chief among them conceptual stretching, and a lack of clarity.39 In
addition, many other “synonyms” are used interchangeably with state capacity, and it can be
difficult to tell which definition scholars are using. Examples include governance, effectiveness,
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Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina, Cornell Studies in
Political Economy CN - HC187 .S445 1991 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Jonathan K Hanson
and Rachel Sigman, “Leviathan’s Latent Dimensions: Measuring State Capacity for Comparative Political
Research,” 2013, p. 2.
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United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and
Technology, 2013, p. 1.
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state building, development, state strength, and institutional capacity. A narrow definition is
advantageous in two ways. First, it avoids normative arguments of what a state should do (for
example, in regard to regime type) and seeks to measure only what a state provides.40 Second, a
narrow definition makes it more feasible to compare de facto state capacity and parent state
capacity across identical or similar measures.
Why does state capacity matter in regard to de facto states and their calculations? In
addition to providing the de facto state with legitimacy as a separate territory, high state capacity
is useful to protect against possible conflict with the parent state in the future.41 De facto states
have an additional incentive to strive for high state capacity. They are not recognized by the
international system, and any military victory that might have occurred as a result of a previous
separatist conflict is tenuous without international acknowledgement.42 As Lynch succinctly
puts it “the separatist authorities profoundly distrust victory. They are all aware they have won
the battle, not the war”43.
My theory is based on disaggregating state capacity into three categories: military
capacity, economic capacity, and administrative capacity. A state (or de facto state) may be
stronger in some areas of state capacity than other—and in fact, I expect this to be the case.44
Together, these should provide a clear picture of how well a state is performing its actions.
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Military capacity is another facet to state capacity and is often thought of in terms of military
power.45 The ability to exert control over a population is central to the definition of statehood.
Most well-known is Weber’s definition of a state, which is an organization that possesses a
monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a territory.46 Economic capacity, simply put, is
the ability to collect revenue for the state through taxes. The state is defined by its ability to
collect revenue and sets the foundation for state power (North 1981; Tilly 1992).47 Collecting
revenue should be successful throughout the state in order to have adequate extractive capacity.
Administrative capacity is less conceptually bound, but it includes “the ability to develop policy,
the ability to produce and deliver public goods and services, and the ability to regulate
commercial activity”.48 Administrative capacity also has a role in monitoring activities of the
state, which is essential in times of rebellion. Weak administrative capacity makes it easier to
groups to rebel.49

Table 2.1: Breakdown of State Capacities
Type of State Capacity
Military (Coercive)
Economic (Extractive)
Administrative

45

Basic Function
Provide security, protect against parent state
Collect revenue, fund state goals
Build institutions, ensure longevity

I will refer to coercive capacity as military capacity.
Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge,
1918), p. 78.
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Patron States
Before discussing the intricacies of military, economic, and administrative capacity, it is
necessary to discuss the role that patron states play in the measurement of de facto state capacity.
To be explicit, in this dissertation, patron states contribute to the capacity of de facto states,
usually militarily, but quite often economically too.50 Having a patron is not necessary or
sufficient for de facto statehood in the general sense, as the case of Somaliland will show.
However, for specific de facto states, it is difficult to imagine survival without a patron. It is
unlikely that Northern Cyprus would have survived without aid from Turkey, for example.
Likewise, without United States support, the security of Taiwan would be called into question.
Patron states are not only important at the inception of de facto statehood.51 Often, they
continue to provide support in the form of soldiers, weapons, military aid, and economic aid in
various forms for years and decades after the fact. To be more specific, two out of three cases in
this dissertation have patrons and this contributes directly to increased military and or economic
capacity. Turkey acts as a patron for Northern Cyprus, and the United States acts as a patron for
Taiwan. But patron state aid is not a nebulous concept. In most cases, the impact can be
measured, as it is further in the case studies.
How exactly does a patron add to military and economic capacity? This depends on the
relationship between the de facto state and patron, and the isolation the de facto state
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https://web.archive.org/web/20210223165859/https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/12/03/introduction-strangeendurance-of-de-facto-states-pub-77841.
51
As Bakke et al. explain, patron states are useful in a post-war setting to build up de facto state
legitimacy. While this study focuses on Russia’s role in the four post-Soviet de facto states, I argue that
Turkey plays a near identical role to Northern Cyprus. See: Kristin M Bakke et al., “Dynamics of StateBuilding after War: External-Internal Relations in Eurasian de Facto States,” Political Geography 63
(2018): pp. 159–73.

30
experiences. For Northern Cyprus, Turkey acted as a lifeboat to the outside world. Turkish
troops invaded the northern part of the island in 1974 and immediately established themselves as
“protectors” of the Turkish Cypriots on the whole of the island. In the ensuing conflict and ethnic
division that ensued, Turkey mostly provided military backing. As Northern Cyprus cemented
itself as a true breakaway region and unrecognized state, Turkey continued to provide military
support. Military support came in the form of troops (30,000), weaponry, foreign military
advisors, and training.52 Turkey was also instrumental in providing the economic lifeline that
kept Northern Cyprus afloat. To get around the economic embargo imposed by the Republic of
Cyprus, Northern Cyprus rerouted all trade through Turkey. Direct economic aid from Turkey
makes up around one-fifth of the budget of Northern Cyprus.53
The story for Taiwan is distinct from Northern Cyprus. While Northern Cyprus received
infusions of soldiers, personnel, and money from Turkey, Taiwan’s patron aided in a different
way. Taiwan once enjoyed the support and recognition of the international community. Once the
recognition of Taiwan was stripped in favor of the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan was
downgraded to an unrecognized state. Nevertheless, Taiwan was able to become an example of
an economic success story in the Asia Pacific region. Economically, they do not rely on patron
help as Northern Cyprus does. Military, Taiwan does receive aid from the United States. This
comes in the form of arms sales, and an underlying commitment that the United States will
defend Taiwan against China.
In summary, the role of patron states can be substantial in calculating the capacity of de
facto states, militarily, economically, and overall. In the theory, this plays an important role,
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because patron state help is subsumed within the state capacity of the de facto state, even though
it is not strictly emanating from the de facto states. This may seem odd at the outset, but not
including patron state aid would distort the true balance of state capacity. Northern Cyprus
would be an unlikely de facto state without Turkey; therefore, it would be inaccurate to exclude
Turkish aid in the measurements. Likewise, Taiwan’s status would be in jeopardy were it not for
the massive arms sales that the United States gives, and the commitment to protect against
China. The type of patron relationship differs case by case, but whether they contribute
positively to a de facto state’s capacity is undeniable.

Military Capacity
Coercive capacity is often thought of in terms of military power. The ability to exert control
over a population is central to the definition of statehood. Most well-known is Weber’s definition
of a state, which is an organization that possesses a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within
a territory.54 Hendrix defines military capacity as “the state’s ability to deter or repel challenges to
its authority with force”.55 Military capacity figures into nearly every definition of state capacity
and reflects a state’s ability to monopolize coercive power.56
A state with adequate military capacity would successfully protect from external threats,
and well as maintain order within the state.57 Namely, military capacity ensures that a state
would be able to use force to adequately repel any threat or challenge, internal or external.
Significantly, this means that internal rebellions within a state would be considered when
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evaluating state capacity. In this project, this matters because the de facto states under study all
came about due to a successful separation from the parent state.58 In those cases, the parent state
was unable to muster enough force to stop the separatists.
Military capacity is usually operationalized by two indicators as: military personnel per
capita and military expenditure.59 In addition, I will include patron support, as it plays a decisive
role in 2 out of 3 cases (Northern Cyprus and Taiwan). My aim is to be able to compare military
capacity across three different dyads: Cyprus vs. Northern Cyprus, China vs. Taiwan, and
Somalia vs. Somaliland. To do that, I will use the De Facto States in International Politics
Dataset and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure
Database.60 Additional measures of state capacity can be gleaned from various state fragility
indices, such as the State Failure Index (Polity IV), or the State Failure Index (Country Indicators
for Foreign Policy).61 These last two datasets are especially useful in comparing the relative lack
of capacity of Somalia vs. its more stable counterpart, Somaliland.
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Economic Capacity
Economic capacity, or extractive capacity, refers to a state’s ability to extract resources
from society.62 These resources are usually in the form of tax extraction and revenue raising. Just
as Weber defines a state as a monopoly on the use of force, the state can also be defined by its
ability to collect revenue.63 Economic capacity, or the ability to collect this revenue, requires
military control of a territory, and ample resources to be able to collect taxes from the
population.64 As such, military control is required for a state to extract resources from a
population. For de facto states, it means the government has to control the territory in order to
employ a force to collect taxes. After establishing territorial control, economic capacity is built
by a state’s ability to centralize the tax system and raise sufficient revenue for protection,
provision of goods, and institutions.65 Collecting taxes efficiently also ensures the state has
sufficient resources to keep functioning.66 This has been the case historically for states, and the
concept holds true for unrecognized states, which have persisted for decades despite disapproval
from the international community.
Measurement of economic capacity is typically taken as a government’s tax revenue,
specifically tax revenue as a portion of GDP.67 In addition to tax revenue as a percentage of
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GDP, total GDP and GDP per capita is also used as indicators of economic capacity. Total GDP
is important to denote the number of resources that a de facto or parent state can marshal, both in
an economic sense, and in preparing for a potential conflict. While size and total GDP does not
fully determine a state’s viability and survival, it is necessary in measuring the capabilities and
comparisons in the case of a de facto state and parent state. A much larger (in an economic
sense) parent state may point to a situation in which the parent state can leverage this economic
imbalance. A prime example of this is China’s economic might and weight being used to wage a
somewhat successful derecognition campaign against Taiwan. China promises economic
material and resources in exchange for a switch in recognition from the Republic of China
(Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China (China).
Additionally, I also use GDP per capita as one indicator of economic capacity. For this, I
utilize Florea’s De Facto States in International Politics Dataset, IMF and World Bank data, and
figures from official government websites.68 My reason for using GDP per capita is to directly
compare the size of the economies per person and standard of living between the de facto state
and parent state. Furthermore, calculating the GDP per capita of each de facto state contributes to
the de facto state scholarship, and makes it possible to compare the de facto state and parent state
on an equal footing. A similar logic is used for calculating the tax revenue as a portion of GDP.
These statistics are not available for de facto states, but by calculating these, comparing
economic capacity becomes less muddled. While a higher total GDP sometimes corresponds to a
higher GDP per capita, as in the case of Northern Cyprus and Cyprus, other times it does not.
While China has a higher total GDP than Taiwan, it has a lower GDP per capita. GDP per capita
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is able to capture sizeable population differences, and often points to whether a country is high
income, middle income, or low income.

Administrative Capacity
Administrative capacity, the third category of state capacity, is based on the Weberian
idea of the modern state and the existence “of a professional and insulated bureaucracy”.69
Hendrix defines it as a state’s ability to collect and manage information (Hendrix 2010:274).
Administrative capacity is less conceptually bound, but it includes “the ability to develop policy,
the ability to produce and deliver public goods and services, and the ability to regulate
commercial activity”.70 Administrative capacity also has a role in monitoring activities of the
state, which is essential in times of rebellion. Essentially, administrative capacity can be thought
as the bureaucratic monitoring structure of the state.
As the broadest type of state capacity, it is the least straightforward to measure, and is not
always neatly measured (in comparison to indicators such as military personnel, or GDP per
capita). To measure administrative capacity, I first conduct a “count” of de facto state institutions
present in the de facto state vs. the parent state. The count ranges from 0-10. The institutions in
question are executive authority, legislature/legislative body, legal system, tax system, welfare
system, foreign affairs institutions/diplomatic missions, media, police, and an independent
banking system. 71
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For the de facto states, the issue is both whether the institutions exist, and the quality of
state building since inception. The two are intertwined, but I separate them out as two indicators
for the following reasons. Most de facto states in Florea’s dataset (the prime source I use for
administrative capacity) have most or all of the institutions present for each year, that is to say
9/10 or 10/10. Typically, all institutions are present, save for foreign affairs
institutions/diplomatic missions, due to either parent state influence, or international
condemnation of secession.
State building itself is more a measure of the quality of administrative capacity, and in
source materials, corresponds more to the length of time that the de facto state has been alive. In
other words, as a de facto state ages, the state building capacity is coded higher. The exact
categorical measurements for state building are low, moderate, high, and very high. A low
degree of state building covers only physical security, and de facto states with this designation
are usually new and post-conflict. A moderate degree of state building has minimal resources
allocated for governance, such as healthcare, and education. De facto states with the moderate
designation are mainly concerned with providing the physical security aspect but can plausibly
put forth enough resources to set up other aspects of governance. For the high and very high
categories of state building, what separates them is essentially the ability to conduct commercial
relations with external partners and have foreign relations with recognized states.72 Both the high
and very high designations assume the presence of all other governance institutions. While the
number of institutions and quality of state building are linked, for theoretical transparency, I will
consider them two separate indicators in determining administrative capacity.
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Table 2.2: Summarizing Indicators for State Capacity Type
State Capacity Type
Military Capacity
Economic Capacity
Administrative Capacity

Indicators
Military Expenditure, Military Personnel, Patron Support
Total GDP, GDP Per Capita, Tax Revenue
Number of Institutions, Institutional Quality

Military Capacity as a Background Condition
As previously noted, state capacity is divided into three categories: military capacity,
economic capacity, and administrative capacity. Because all of the cases were born in a conflict,
military capacity is embedded into the theory as a background condition and becomes a
prerequisite for the continuation of an unrecognized state. In other words, military capacity is an
absolute necessity, which is why it is considered essential and a background condition for the
existence of a de facto. The reason for this is that, simply put, de facto states need to have a high
level of military capacity in order to protect against military confrontation from the parent state,
which presents an existential threat to the unrecognized state. A de facto state with low levels of
military capacity, that is, without the ability to defend itself, is unlikely to exist, because it will
lose the bid for separatism.73 A secessionist movement would be defeated if it did not have the
capability to hold the territory it wants to keep and defend against an incursion by the parent
state. A defeat at the civil conflict stage makes it impossible for a de facto state to come into
being. The literature on state-building in de facto states notes the heavy emphasis on military
power, further underscoring the importance of detailing the separate facets of state capacity. The
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emphasis on security in de facto states leads to highly militarized societies, with high standing
army numbers, and sometimes mandatory military training.74 The historical military victory
often found in the narratives of de facto states perfectly juxtaposes the precarious condition that
de facto states find themselves under and further underscores the premium placed on military
capacity. Without international recognition, de facto states are precarious in their military victory
and “existentially insecure”.75
Military capacity is merely the first step in the journey of state building that de facto
states undertake. The aspect of de facto statehood that is most precarious, unrecognition, is also
what serves to incentive de facto states to build an entity that can defend against the parent state,
and which signals viability to the international community.76 Without international protection, de
facto states consider military power as the only means to deter the parent state, leading de facto
states to spotlight military expenditures and reliance on a patron for security needs.
At a minimum, there needs to be parity between the de facto state and the parent state at
the military level, although this can include aid and protection provided by the patron state. De
facto states, such as Somaliland, are at least militarily equal, if not superior, than the parent state,
without patron help. On the other hand, de facto states like Northern Cyprus and South Ossetia
are only able to close the military gap thanks to patron help. Either way, without sufficient
military capacity to hold off the parent state, a de facto state does not exist or is forcefully
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reintegrated into the parent state.77 This means that a base level of military power is necessary,
enough to deter the parent state from attacking, or enough to not lose a military confrontation to
the parent state.
Examples of “failed” de facto states show what occurs when the military balance of
power heavily favors, or begins to heavily favor, the parent state. From 1991-1999, Chechnya
existed as a de facto state, but was brought to a violent end by Russia in the Second Chechen
War.78 The beginning of the end for the Chechnyan de facto state occurred once they could not
win a military confrontation with Russia. In 1995, the Serbian de facto state of Krajina served as
another example of de facto state eradication. Likewise, the de facto state of Tamil Eelam
disappeared in 2009 when the Sri Lankan government took back territorial control over areas that
previously belonged to Tamil Eelam.79 Once territorial control is lost, secessionist entities cannot
credibly claim to be states without recognition.
If high military state capacity is prevalent in all or most existing de facto states, it
becomes crucial to examine the ways in which the other two (extractive and administrative)
matter. Militaries need money to function, but high economic state capacity is not a given if there
is a patron state providing money and resources, as is the case with South Ossetia and Russia.80
Administrative capacity suffers if the de facto state sacrifices other expenditures for the sake of
the military, which seems to happen in some cases. For example, from 2002-2011, Somaliland
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spent an estimated 51% of the government budget on security services.81 This comes at the
expense of such government services such as education and healthcare, and does not make for
robust administrative capacity.

Economic Capacity and Administrative Capacity: Separate or Intertwined?
With military capacity necessary to declare a de facto state, I find that economic and
administrative capacity are two factors driving de facto state strategies for independence.
Economic capacity differs between states and differs from de facto state to parent state. Raising
revenue is crucial to creating the trappings of statehood. For one, a state (or unrecognized state)
with a higher economic capacity is able to carry out goals more effectively, provide public
goods, and spend on defense, relative to a state that has a lower economic capacity. This in turn,
makes it possible for the (de facto) state to extend its rule.82 Even though military capacity is
high in most de facto states, increasing economic capacity is the only way to spend more on
defense, especially without a patron present (such as in Somaliland). In de facto states with a
patron that already provides military aid, the money can instead be used for development,
increasing quality of institutions, and building relations with recognized states (such as in
Taiwan). In de facto states with a patron that provides both military and economic aid, the money
can be put towards bettering the existing institutions of the de facto state (such as Northern
Cyprus).
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A minimum level of revenue-raising is necessary to increase administrative capacity and
improve institutions. However, as previously noted, de facto states will prioritize security first,
and then put resources into other facets of state building, such as education, welfare, health, and
legal system. Furthermore, the state could have the ability to extract revenue at an adequate level
and still have poor administrative capacity due to corruption, short time as a state, or
isolation/nonrecognition. Poor institutions can result in a discontented population, but it will not
threaten the existence of a de facto state the way a parent state occupation would.

Case Selection and Research Design
Why these three cases in particular? The universe of all de facto states, both former and
present, is thirty-four. For the purposes of this dissertation, I limited my case selection to current
de facto states, which number eighteen. Why not choose former de facto states? For one, I am
interested in preferences, not outcomes. My theory is a partial explanation for preferences for
reintegration, status quo, or statehood for current de facto states, using relative state capacity.
Former de facto states by definition already have an outcome: either violent reintegration into the
parent state, peaceful reintegration into the parent state, or statehood granted by the international
community. Having the outcome already decided, it would be difficult to tease out the role that
state capacity played versus the role that the international community and other factors played in
deciding the outcome. For this dissertation, I purposefully focus solely on relative state capacity
between the two actors.
Former de facto states fall into one of three categories. The first is forceful reintegration
into the parent state. After a period of time, the de facto state lost the conflict with the parent
state and was forced back into the parent state. In Table 1.5, I note six cases of former de facto
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states being subsumed by forceful reintegration: Katanga (Democratic Republic of Congo),
Biafra (Nigeria), Krajina (Croatia), Chechnya (Russia), Anjouan (Comoros), and Tamil Eelam
(Sri Lanka).
The second category of former de facto states is peaceful reintegration. This means that
even though there was conflict, both sides agreed to a peaceful negotiation, and more
importantly, the de facto state acquiesced to some form or autonomy within the parent state. I
note six instances of peaceful reintegration in Table 1.6: Rwenzururu Kingdom (Uganda),
Gagauzia (Moldova), Bougainville (Papua New Guinea), Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), Ajaria
(Georgia), and Aceh (Indonesia). Of these six, two are counted by multiple scholars: Gagauzia,
and Bougainville.
The third category of former de facto states is independence. This occurs when the
international community agrees that a territory is deserving of statehood. It is not common,
especially compared to the number of secessionist movements in existence, which number more
than 50 as of 2011.83 I note five cases (in Table 1.8) of former de facto states becoming
recognized states: Eritrea, East Timor, Montenegro, Kosovo, and South Sudan. Of these five, just
two find agreement among two or more scholars: Eritrea and Kosovo.
Table 1.7 lists the number of current de facto states at eighteen. While one theoretically
could conduct a study of relative state capacity on any of the eighteen current de facto states, in
reality it would prove unfeasible for more than a few of the cases. The first consideration is the
unavailability of data on measures of state capacity. Data on military capacities could be
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unavailable or closely guarded for cases where conflict is ongoing, such as the Burmese cases of
Karen State and Kachin State, or the case of Casamance, within Senegal. Likewise economic and
administrative capacity data would be unlikely to be available in these conflict areas.
De facto states such as Western Sahara, Palestine, and Gaza are likewise places where
state capacity would be difficult to measure, due to repression and parent state influence. In the
case of Western Sahara, the area is sparsely populated, and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic controls only 20% of the claimed territory, with the remaining 80% being administrated
by parent state Morocco. Additionally, the recent Israel-Morocco deal saw the United States
agree to recognize Morocco’s claims over Western Sahara, leaving the fate of the disputed
territory unclear.
Of these eighteen current de facto states, only nine have consensus among multiple
scholars. Essentially, these are the territories that have a stronger case to make for unrecognized
statehood. These are: Taiwan, Northern Cyprus, Abkhazia, Kurdistan, Nagorno-Karabakh,
Somaliland, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Republika Srpska. From thirty-four, to eighteen, to
nine possible cases, I carefully considered possibilities based on access to data on military,
economic, and administrative capacity measures, as well as longevity of the de facto state. An
“older” de facto state, all things equal, would provide more insight into changing state capacity,
and whether the territory’s state capacity improved, declined, or stayed static over time. While
state capacity measures are likely to be present for the parent state over a period of time, the
same cannot be said for de facto states. Preliminary research indicated that more established de
facto states were likely to have more data available, as government institutions were built and
reported upon. As a de facto state transitions from a secessionist movement, to a breakaway
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territory, to an unrecognized state, more robust data on military figures, economic output, and
administrative buildup becomes available.
Background research and interviews with officials from the post-Soviet de facto states,
specifically Abkhazia, pointed to an additional methodological concern for studying state
capacity. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, government figures may hide disappointing statistics,
making it difficult as a scholar to do a comparative study in a transparent manner.
In identifying suitable cases for state capacity comparison, I focused on longevity, data
collection availability, and transparency. The first case study, Northern Cyprus, entered
unrecognized statehood in 1974, and issued a unilateral declaration of independence in 1983.
Additionally, “the Cyprus Problem”, which refers to the separation of the island along
geographic and ethnic lines, is a conflict that the international community has poured extensive
resources into resolving since before Northern Cyprus broke away. The United Nations
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, or UNFICYP, is one of the longest-running UN missions, having
been set up in 1964.84 Information on Northern Cyprus’ military is available throughout this time
due to the political tension of Turkish troops on the island. Likewise, figures on economic output
and administrative statistics are present on both government publications, and verifiable on
outside sources.
The second case study, Taiwan, likewise meets the criteria for longevity, data collection
availability, and transparency. Having been “demoted” to de facto statehood in 1971, close to
five decades of data are present in order to conduct a comparative state capacity study with the
parent state. Figures for Taiwan, unlike with other de facto states, are commonly found on
datasets reserved for recognized states. In particular, economic data are easy to cross reference
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and are readily transparent. Military figures, both with and without United States support, exist
in a sufficient manner to compare to similarly high-level Chinese figures.
Finally, the third case study of Somaliland meets the ultimate criteria of longevity, data
collection availability, and transparency. A de facto state since 1991, it is a similar age of the
four post-Soviet de facto states.85 Eager to show their successful state building project after
conflict, Somaliland figures for military, economic, and administrative capacity are present, to a
degree. Information for the 1990s is not obtainable. However, figures for the parent state,
Somalia, are similarly not accessible, for reasons due to a failed state status, corruption, and lack
of government function.
On a more methodological note, I strive to present my case selection as both a
representative sample, and useful variation on the areas of theoretical interest.86 In this
dissertation, the areas of theoretical interest being preferences for sovereignty: reintegration,
status quo, or statehood. As a representative sample, the three cases of Northern Cyprus, Taiwan,
and Somaliland attempt to capture the range of cases on a geographic scale. Furthermore, the
cases are diverse, that is, they represent the full variation of the population.87 Previous research
conducted in the preliminary stages of the dissertation sought to include more cases, namely one
or more of the post-Soviet de facto states. For reasons relating to data transparency and
availability, it was not feasible to include these cases as complete cases.
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Overall, the study of unrecognized states is one of a small-n universe, with a ceiling of
thirty-four on the high end. As noted previously, this shrinks to eighteen when only examining
current de facto states, and then shrinks again to nine when only including cases with scholarly
consensus. Like most small-n studies, this dissertation focuses more on examining a small
number of cases in depth versus large-n studies, which look for overall patterns in a larger set.
The tradeoff with this concerns internal and measurement validity versus external validity. As a
small-n study of three de facto states, this dissertation further enriches the literature by providing
more context for the cases in question and is theory-driven. The comparative method aids in
generating a theory, in this case, the role that state capacity plays in shaping preferences for
unrecognized states.88 However, the shortfall of this is the external validity and the ability to be
generalizable to other cases suffers. Furthermore, the theory is a partial explanation for de facto
state strategy, owing to the fact that international system factors can and do affect both
preferences and outcomes. It is also not deterministic, nor predictive. Northern Cyprus’
preference for reintegration happened due increasing inequality on economic and administrative
capacity across both sides of the divide. International system factors also likely played a role—
Northern Cyprus leadership had long been seen as intransigent and stubborn on the Cyprus
problem. The 2004 vote, bolstered by civil society and a grassroots movement focused on unity,
saw this opportunity as a chance to switch the narrative surrounding the Turkish Cypriots. For
Taiwan, state capacity factors inform their preferences to thread the status quo needle to an
extent. Parent state dynamics, both internal and on the world stage, are also considerations that
make a push for independence unlikely for Taiwan. For Somaliland, a higher state capacity
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meant that a preference for statehood formed, in spite of disinterest and apathy by the
international community to recognize the territory.
Despite the struggles to external validity faced by a small-n analysis of three
unrecognized states, I note that there is room to derive lessons from these cases. For one, going
forward, scholars can use the template of comparing state capacities between de facto states and
parent states across as many measurements as possible. This is will enable a more honest and
thorough examination of de facto state viability and success with state building. Unrecognized
states often use arguments that relate back to their ability to function as a state to justify
separation from the parent state. 89

Data Collection and Interviews
Before the bulk of the data collection process, I utilized interviews of various officials from
Northern Cyprus as a starting point in preliminary research.90 The interviews were informative
and provided adequate background and context to a case that continues to plague the
international community. They were useful in explaining the thinking of the government (in
general) in the run-up to the 2004 vote.91 The interviews provided a way to scope out the
viability in the case study of Northern Cyprus, as well as a way to hear about potential alternative
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explanations to the state capacity argument. Ultimately, elite interviews provided the best way to
gain information from those involved with matter of interest: the 2004 vote that saw Northern
Cyprus vote for reintegration with the Republic of Cyprus and gain EU membership.92 To a
lesser extent, there is also the story of the subsequent change in government to a center-left party
that was pro-unification.
The interviewees were composed of academics, politicians, former state officials, and former
representatives involved in the longstanding talks between the governments of Northern Cyprus
and Republic of Cyprus. Originally, I identified four interviewees prior to my arrival in Northern
Cyprus. While there, my original interview subjects were instrumental in introducing me to more
people to interview and ask questions.93 The interviews themselves were conducted in a variety
of places: Eastern Mediterranean University in Famagusta (about an hour north of Nicosia), the
office of former president Mehmet Ali Talat, a government statistical office, the border zone
between Northern Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus, a furniture store in Northern Cyprus
belonging to a former high-ranking negotiator on the TRNC side, and various restaurants on the
northern part of Nicosia. My questions centered around the event of interest: the 2004 vote to
reunite the north and the south of the island. In particular, I was curious to know what provided
the catalyst for change. Given the longstanding security and political concerns, namely Turkish
troops stationed in the north of the island, and securing adequate political rights for Turkish
Cypriots, why was the vote (on the Northern Cyprus side) so overwhelmingly in favor of the
Annan Plan? Additionally, to what extent did the current (early 2000s period) economic
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situation and future economic outlook play in convincing the government to back the plan, and
the population to accept it?
Overall, the interviews cemented the idea that 2004 represented a time where the stars could
have aligned for the Turkish Cypriots but did not. Civil society helped to galvanize enthusiasm
for the Annan Plan—to vote for it would mean access to the European Union and a brighter
future for the part of the island that was perennially cut off from the rest of the world. I was
especially interested and invested in interviewing elites in Northern Cyprus because the case
represents an instance where reintegration was the preference by the de facto state, as evidenced
by both the 2004 vote, and subsequent change in government that represented pro-unification
interests. Moreover, reintegration was preferred even when accounting for a decades long
problem based on ethnic conflict that led to resentment on both sides. One would expect that
based on the government’s previous intransigence, reintegration would be a nonstarter for
Northern Cyprus. Instead, more than three quarters of Northern Cyprus voted to become a united
island. The interviews pointed to the idea that the people on the north of the island were ready
for a change in their de facto statehood status and saw that opportunity in the form of the Annan
Plan. The vote represented years of work by peace groups, civil society, and negotiators at the
highest levels of government. It also, of course, increased the political goodwill for Northern
Cyprus, who had previously been perceived as difficult to negotiate with under Denktaş.
While the interviews themselves were helpful to frame the Northern Cyprus case study, they
were never meant to be a sole source of data. It was immensely useful to hear from people
intimately involved in the peace process in 2004, a few of whom also offered their thoughts on
the current iteration of the Cyprus Problem as it stands today. As a researcher, the interviews in
Northern Cyprus helped to cement the case study, illuminate alternative explanations, and set up
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the framing and context of the case. After the interviews, I continued with the next stage of the
research process for the dissertation, which focused on theory building and data collection.
For data collection of the case studies, I use a mixture of digital archives, government
publications (print), and government figures published on official websites (such as economic
data) to build my theory and present a clear argument. Because de facto states are not recognized
on the international stage, indicators for these areas are often lacking in traditional academic or
policy datasets, creating a gap in which I answer in this dissertation. Even though de facto states
control their territory and provide public goods and services to their population, these numbers
do not often make it onto large N datasets that compare countries. To answer for this, I construct
datasets for each de facto state with indicators of military capacity, economic capacity, and
administrative capacity. I do this in order to be able to compare each type of state capacity
between the parent state and the de facto state. A major contribution to the study of de facto
states is evident because while previously one could argue the data existed in some way, I
expand on this work by first calculating several missing measures that previously were not
available for de facto states, and second, construct the datasets to provide a direct comparison for
state capacities between de facto states and parent states. I do this in a way that allows for
comparison with the same category, instead of relying on estimates for de facto states. To give
concrete examples, it was necessary to calculate figures for the following. For Northern Cyprus,
my work directly led to calculating accurate numbers in multiple years for: military spending as
a percentage of GDP, GDP per capita, tax revenue as a percentage of GDP, income
classification, and Turkish aid as a percentage of the budget. Overall, to provide accurate
comparisons, it was necessary to convert the reported figures in the Turkish Lira to U.S. Dollars,
and most importantly, peg the conversion rate to year. This is especially important as the Turkish
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Lira underwent periods of decline, which affected the Northern Cyprus economy directly. For
Taiwan, new figures include military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and U.S. arm sales to
Taiwan, both of which deal with the military capacity argument I put forth for Taiwan as a
comparison to China. While China clearly dwarfs Taiwan on military personnel and expenditure,
my figures help make an argument that Taiwan has its own formidable military capacity
bolstered by the United States. For Somaliland, new calculations were needed for: security
spending, security spending as a percentage of the budget, and GDP per capita. Somaliland
presented the most challenges to data collection because of its relative underdevelopment
compared to the other de facto states, and the fragility of the parent state, Somalia.
For this dissertation, I constructed three datasets. One dataset focused on figures for Northern
Cyprus, one for Taiwan, and one for Somaliland. Within each dataset, there are specific
measurements for both the de facto state and the parent state. To begin, there are comparisons for
Freedom House scores for each de facto-parent state dyad. While Freedom House scores and
general democratic values are not part of my theory centering state capacity, this was a useful
comparison to set up the argument that de facto states often use to garner sympathy for their
cause. In order to appeal to other countries, de facto states will often point to both their
functionality in terms of capacity, as well as the increasing democratic values. One resource that
shows this are Freedom House scores. For each of the de facto states of Northern Cyprus,
Taiwan, and Somaliland, they all have increasing civil and political liberties scores throughout
the years.94
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The remaining points in the datasets correspond directly to either military, economic, or
administrative capacity. First, data points for military capacity were collected and collated.
Within this, the numbers for military personnel appear first. Military personnel refer to the
number of people that the de facto state and parent state have available in the armed forces. For
Northern Cyprus, these figures include Turkish troops on the island. For Taiwan and Somaliland,
these figures only account for soldiers from Taiwan and Somaliland. After military personnel,
military expenditure is calculated, both for the de facto state and parent state. Two types of data
were collected for general “military expenditure”. The first refers to total military expenditure in
U.S. Dollars, and the second refers to military expenditure as a percentage of GDP. For
Somaliland, I use reported figures for security spending in lieu of total military expenditure.
Security spending is also calculated in U.S. Dollars. Security spending as a percentage of budget
replaces military expenditure as a percentage of GDP for Somaliland and Somalia. As a final
point for military expenditure, I include the numbers for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. This
provides a snapshot of the available weapons systems that Taiwan acquired from the United
States.
Next, there are the data figures that correspond to economic capacity. First and second
respectively are GDP, and GDP per capita, with a direct comparison between the de facto state
and parent state. Likewise, tax revenue as a percentage of GDP (not available for Somaliland and
Somalia) is also a measure used for economic capacity, as it indicates the government’s ability to
perform a basic task. I also include the income classification for de facto states, a figure
previously reserved for recognized states. This is a rough approximation of where an economy
“falls”: low, middle, upper-middle, and high income. Finally, the next part of the datasets
corresponds to administrative capacity. These include a count of the number of institutions
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present in the de facto state, and as well as the level of state building by year. While a count of
institutions may seem like a basic measure, de facto states have an inherent disadvantage in a
system that will not extend recognition. Therefore, one cannot assume all the institutions are in
place at the birth of a new unrecognized state.

Alternative Explanations
In this dissertation, state capacity is used as a partial explanation for why a de facto state
might choose to forgo independence, keep the status quo, or pursue statehood. In reality, state
capacity is but a series of measures that informs, but does not dictate, the actions that a de facto
state will take. For one, it does not account for specific local factors like nationalist sentiment,
distrust, ethnic conflict, and past history. State capacity does also not take into account external
(international) factors shaping preferences. For the most part, the theory of relative state capacity
deals more explicitly with the de facto – parent state dyad. This section will first touch on
alternative explanations pertaining to local factors: namely nationalism and ethnic conflict. In
other words, why would ethnic conflict not inform preferences for Northern Cyprus’ strategy?
Why is state capacity more correct as a partial explanation for Somaliland, rather than ethnic
conflict? Would Taiwan’s distrust of mainland China not push it towards a strategy of overt
independence? Instead, we see them battling to keep the status quo. Given the strong issues of
identity, why do we see de facto states moving back and forth in their preferences? The second
alternative explanation explored here focuses on international factors informing de facto state
preferences. For example, would the lack of international engagement toward Northern Cyprus
not be a better explanation for their stance on reintegration, rather than state capacity arguments?
Does Taiwan’s status as partially recognized not lend itself to a status quo preference? Lastly,
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given Somaliland’s strong preference for independence, why are they not recognized by more
states?
Identity issues when regarding de facto states preferences towards sovereignty can be
thought of as a complement, rather than an adversary, to state capacity arguments presented in
this dissertation. Having a lower state capacity relative to the parent state does not preclude
ethnic issues. The allure of the Annan Plan, and widening economic gaps between both parts of
the island did not erase the distrust between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots
overnight. Rather, in this instance, it was not the deciding factor for voting in favor of the Annan
Plan.95 For Taiwan, distrust of mainland China and widening political differences help to cement
the preference against unification, but the relative state capacity is what stops Taiwan from
pursuing full-throated independence. Somaliland’s past history under different colonial rulers,
and the recent memories of the atrocities in the civil war incentivized an early preference for
independence. Later, successful state building by Somaliland helped ensure a greater state
capacity than the parent state, which led to a continued independence strategy. In other words,
identity-based arguments are woven into the history of all de facto states, and to disregard them
in favor of a purely structural argument is inaccurate. Identity based factors would make
reintegration an unlikely preference for de facto states, however, at least one case, Northern
Cyprus, shows a different strategy. This means that an identity-based argument alone would not
be enough to form a satisfactory theory on de facto state preference.
Alternative theories that center international reticence as the sole reason for a de facto
state’s strategy towards independence also cannot explain the variation in cases, such as
Northern Cyprus and Somaliland. Likewise, (partial) recognition alone cannot predict that
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pursuing independence will be a sure thing. In both instances, the international factors provide
only a bird’s eye view of de facto states in general. By focusing on the state capacity dynamics
of de facto states and parent states, my theory provides a more satisfying answer to partially
explain why strategies among de facto states differ.
For example, in the case of Northern Cyprus, the successful isolation and nonrecognition
campaign waged by the Republic of Cyprus was immensely successful due to buy-in from other
states. Northern Cyprus never became viable because not only were they unrecognized, but also
because this led to their inability to conduct economic business with any other state other than
Turkey. In this case, one might argue that international pressure alone informed Northern
Cyprus’ embrace of reintegration. However, this framing of the Northern Cyprus case does not
paint a full picture and obfuscates the internal dynamics of Northern Cyprus from 1974-2004,
and also does not fully delve into the de facto state-parent state relationship. The divergence in
economic development and state building between Northern Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus
provides a robust justification to Northern Cyprus’ pro-unification stance.
Additionally, the case of Somaliland shows that international hesitation and refusal to
recognize de facto states do not always deter one from pursuing independence. Somaliland has,
since 1991, desired a full and independent state from the country of Somalia. This is despite
Somaliland itself being poor, and without a patron state. However, despite this, Somaliland has
made inroads over time to build a strong case for being their own independent state. Over time,
the measures of state capacity for Somaliland have slowly but surely eclipsed Somalia, despite
the latter having international aid, and the benefits of statehood. In the cases of Northern Cyprus
and Somaliland, international factors alone cannot explain the desire to move away or embrace
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independence. Rather, it is necessary to look closer at the relationship between the de facto state
and the parent state, and how their state capacity differs.
Furthermore, the case of Taiwan shows that even when there is recognition from other
states, that alone is not sufficient to sway a de facto state towards declaring independence.
Despite formal diplomatic relations with over a dozen states, and robust trade (two benchmarks
that make it the envy of other de facto states), Taiwan does not currently fit the profile of an
unrecognized state pursuing independence, but rather one that is content with the uneasy status
quo. Once again, the relative state capacity between the de facto state and parent state matters
here—quite a bit. China’s role in ensuring Taiwan’s status quo despite all the benchmarks for
independence (and desire) cannot be overstated.

Chapter Summary
De facto states are areas within recognized states that broke away and are looking for
independence granted by the international community. Despite this expectation that de facto
states will vie for recognition, there are some instances where this is not the case. The puzzle I
examine is: Under what conditions do de facto states forgo independence? Why did Northern
Cyprus agree to a plan to reunite with the Republic of Cyprus, despite being a stable de facto
state for 21 years? Why does Taiwan practice a strategy dubbed “deliberate ambiguity”, in the
face of rising pro-independence feelings?
I theorize that one partial explanation for these aberrations is the comparative state
capacity between the de facto state and the parent state. Essentially, a case where the de facto
state has a lower state capacity will be more likely to favor reintegration (Northern Cyprus). A
case where a de facto state and parent state have a relatively equal / matched level of state

57
capacity would mean that the status quo would be preferred for the time being (Taiwan). Finally,
a case where the de facto state is stronger in state capacity compared to the parent state presents a
“classical” case, where the de facto state continues to vie for independence (Somaliland).
State capacity is broken up into three categories: military, economic, and administrative.
Because of their precarious position regarding sovereignty and recognition, I expect all three
cases (Northern Cyprus, Taiwan, and Somaliland) to have high levels of military capacity. After
all, in order to successfully break away from the parent state, there had to have been a successful
military campaign in the past. For this reason, military capacity is present as a background
condition, although it is still measured. I do this using military personnel per capita, military
expenditure, and patron support. I expect there to be much more variation among economic
capacity and administrative capacity. Economic capacity is measured using GDP per capita, and
tax revenue as a portion of GDP. Finally, administrative capacity is measured by institutional
count, and institutional quality, using a devised scale.
My theory only serves as a partial explanation and does not claim to be deterministic.
Moreover, I look at the cases at a point in time, and do not claim that their preferences will
remain static throughout time. For example, in the case of Taiwan, China’s rise means that
Taiwan may very well be forced to accept a Hong Kong like solution or risk military conflict. In
Northern Cyprus post 2004, despite both sides publicly calling for a federal solution, high-level
talks continue to fail, the most recently in 2017 at Crans-Montana. Somaliland, which continues
to vie for independence, is brought in as a “typical” case, and serves to contrast with the two
other cases, which serve as the inspiration for the main puzzle.
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Chapter 3: Northern Cyprus and Reintegration
In this chapter, I examine the case of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). I
examine why the TRNC has signaled its desire to reunify with the Republic of Cyprus. Why was
the TRNC willing to forgo independence after 21 years of being a de facto state? I argue that
disparities in state capacity between the TRNC and the Republic of Cyprus (the parent state)
contributed to the desire of a unified state for the TRNC. On one end of the island, the
inhabitants of the Republic of Cyprus had comparatively higher standard of living and were
about to reap the benefits of membership from the European Union (and all of the monetary and
political benefits it came with). To the north of the island, the TRNC struggled as a poor island
economy, mostly due to economic isolation and reliance on Turkey. Specifically, I find that
economic and administrative state capacity were especially unequal between the TRNC and the
Republic of Cyprus. Militarily, the TRNC was guaranteed security by Turkish forces stationed
on the island. However, military capacity is only one aspect of state capacity, and alone it is not
enough to guarantee a prosperous future for the de facto state. Political nonrecognition and
economic isolation led to lower levels of economic and administrative capacity, which in turn
made independence less favorable, and reintegration more favorable.
The TRNC declared independence on November 15, 1983.96 This came nine years after a
Turkish military invasion of the northern part of the island of Cyprus. For years following the
declaration of independence, a solution eluded leaders, as both sides demanded guarantees that
the other was not willing to follow through. For the Greek Cypriots, the most important issues
were Turkish soldiers on the northern part of the island, and homes lost due to the displacement
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following the invasion.97 The Turkish Cypriots demanded political equality on an ethnically
divided island where they made up about 30 percent of the population, compared to 70 percent
who were Greek Cypriots. For some time, the government of Northern Cyprus was staunchly
against unification with the Greek Cypriots, especially under the founding leadership of Rauf
Denktaş, who served as president throughout the various iterations of the Northern Cyprus de
facto state. He first served as the president of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (19751983), and then president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (1983-2005). With Turkey
as a patron state, international isolation hardly mattered for Northern Cyprus. However, over the
years, the pro-secessionist attitude has undergone change.
The idea of eventually reunifying the island under a bi-communal, bizonal, federal
system was proposed by the UN Security Council in 1977, before TRNC’s unilateral declaration
of independence. Trying to implement this idea, however, has been unsuccessful so far. In 1992,
the two sides came closer than ever to an agreement, but this ultimately fell through. A new
comprehensive peace plan was proposed in 2002 by the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan.
This peace plan went through various iterations before being finalized and presented to the
public. In 2003, the Green Line was opened, which opened several border crossings in
Nicosia/Lefkosia.
In 2004, the Annan Plan, in its fifth iteration, was put forth to a referendum vote. This
plan would reunify the island under one federal state and allow Cyprus to join the European
Union as a unified island. While 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots were in favor of the peace plan,
it was rejected by 76 percent of Greek Cypriots, and it did not pass.98 Not only was unification at
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stake, but the chance for Turkish Cypriots to become EU members. When the deal did not pass,
Cyprus became an EU member, but Northern Cyprus did not.
In Northern Cyprus, nationalist parties were consistently in power until 2003, when
center-left parties won more elections, with support of the business community and civil society
groups.99 The center left parties emphasized differences between Turks and Turkish Cypriots, not
just the differences between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. They argued that Turkish
Cypriot aims could be achieved in a federal settlement. This guaranteed self-rule and minimum
interference.100 In addition to gains from center-left parties, there was widespread disapproval
over TRNC President Denktaş, with demonstrations taking place in the winter of 2002-2003.
Against this backdrop, Turkish Cypriots admitted that the EU decision to accept Cyprus
affected their positions and the evolution of the conflict.101 Northern Cyprus could only enjoy the
benefits of the EU if it joined as a state, so they would have to join as a united island since no
state except Turkey recognized Northern Cyprus. Most of the gains offered to Northern Cyprus
for joining the EU were economic. These gains would bring an end to 30 years economic
isolation, and would bring access to the EU market, increased tourism and investment, and the
adoption of the Euro.102
Domestic political shifts in Northern Cyprus suggested that EU economic incentives did
work on the Turkish Cypriot public. The Turkish economic upheaval from 1999-2001 hit
Northern Cyprus particularly hard as well since they were tied to the Lira.103 There was a
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growing feeling that TRNC was being governed by Turkey.104 In 1994, Denktaş argued that
economic difficulties meant that TRNC should unite with Turkey.105 In the TRNC, large deficits
were and are financed through Turkish aid.106
The financial crisis in Turkey caused some groups to begin advocating for less reliance
on Turkey. Groups such as the Turkish Cypriot Teacher Syndicate took out an ad in a
newspaper: “Ankara, we don’t want your money, your programme, your clients and we just want
to govern ourselves”.107 Turkish Cypriots peace activists, political parties, and trade unions
focused on mobilizing masses to support the Annan Plan. Many of the protestors saw Denktaş,
with his unwillingness to support the plan or generally any agreement, as one of those
responsible for the division of the island. EU membership and reunification became common
themes during the rallies.108 Mehmet Ali Talat, the prime minister who came to power for TRNC
in 2003, differed completely from Denktaş, as he supported the Annan Plan and also focused on
mobilizing the people to vote yes. He used the concepts of a common homeland and a united
Cyprus.109
I argue that lower relative state capacity is one reason why Turkish Cypriots were in
favor of reintegration in the run up to EU accession and the Annan Plan referendum.
Comparatively, Turkish Cypriots were worse off economically and administratively (but not
militarily) than Greek Cypriots. Economic isolation due to a worldwide embargo meant that the
TRNC could not rely on economic aid from the from the international community or other states,
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only their patron, Turkey. The Turkish Cypriot economy, vulnerable to economic developments
in Turkey, was wholly dependent on them for aid transfers.110 Additionally, with the economic
embargo also came diplomatic isolation, which provided few avenues for Northern Cyprus to
further their interests.111

Figure 3.1: Map of Northern Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus112

110

Mehmet Emre Gorgulu, “The Effects of Isolation on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,”
MPRA Paper (Munich, 2014), https://web.archive.org/save/https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62077/, pp.
1-2. Due to the Annan Plan having failed to be implemented, most of the conditions present in 2004 are
still the case today.
111
Deon Geldenhuys, Contested States in World Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 180,
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230234185.
112
Map appears in forthcoming book: The Sovereignty Game: Secessionist Strategy and Tactics in the
International System (Griffiths 2021).

63
The Cyprus Question and Theoretical Framework for Reintegration
In the case of Northern Cyprus, the question is: Why did Northern Cyprus agree to a deal
that would reunite the island under a federal system? In other words, why were they willing to
give up de facto statehood after decades? This chapter finds that due to low economic and
administrative capacity, in addition to economic incentives, Northern Cyprus favored unification
with the Republic of Cyprus for a period of time.
This chapter will look at the time period of de facto statehood where independence was
the prevailing attitude, and then look at the shift from the pro-independence stance to the proreunification stance. In addition, I will look at one of the underlying reasons for the shift from
pro-independence to pro-reunification. My theory posits that unequal state capacity between
Northern Cyprus (de facto state) and the Republic of Cyprus (parent state) contributed to the
shift from pro-independence to pro-reunification. In this case, state capacity is unequal in favor
of the Republic of Cyprus. As shown in the figure below, my theory shows that an unequal
distribution of state capacity in favor of the parent state will most likely result in a reintegration
stance by the de facto state, as well as the specific factor that led to this preference for Northern
Cyprus.113
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Figure 3.2: Northern Cyprus Reintegration Model
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Engaging Identity Based Alternative Explanations for Northern Cyprus
Before examining the state capacity argument as it pertains to Northern Cyprus
specifically, alternative explanations based on ethnic conflict between the Turkish Cypriots and
Greek Cypriots are worth exploring, in conjunction with the way this operates within an
international system that frowns on secession. As previously discussed, the Cyprus Problem
spans many decades and both sides of the divide. Historically, the conflict between the Turkish
Cypriot and Greek Cypriot community has been dominated by the demands of ethnonationalists
on both sides.114 The hurt caused by the sustained conflict undoubtedly produced distrust on both
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sides, and issues concerning territory, sovereignty, and power-sharing have sunk each and every
attempt to resolve the conflict. At the end of each spectrum, both sides have at some point
advocated for separation based on ethnicity. In 1955, Greek nationalists called for enosis, which
advocated union with Greece, while some Turkish Cypriots responded in kind, calling for taksim,
or partition.115 By the 1960s, the ideals of enosis and taksim characterized the tension between
the two groups on the island, which led to violent confrontations in the capital, which eventually
spread to the rest of the island. Due to the nature of the conflict, the Green Line, which divided
the groups on a north-south axis that is still in place today, was established, and the United
Nations began their peacekeeping mission (which also remains to this day).116
At the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, negotiations began to break the political
impasse, which mostly centered around territory and political rights for each group. The situation
escalated in July 1974, when the Greek Cypriot right-wing extremist group EOKA B launched a
coup against Makarios, the Cypriot president at the time. The group was aided by the junta that
ruled Greece at the time, with the aim of uniting the island with Greece. As a result of these
actions, Turkey invaded the northern part of the island. The 1974 division is still in place today.
In 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was born, denoting the start of the de facto
state, which is only recognized by Turkey. Overall, negotiations on the Turkish Cypriot side
have failed because generally, the Turkish Cypriots desire more separation under a federal
framework, which would allow for more political rights and representation. With Greek Cypriots

115

Yiannis Papadakis, “Locating the Cyprus Problem: Ethnic Conflict and the Politics of Space,” Hybrid
Geographies in the Eastern Mediterranean: Views from the Bosphorus 15 (2005): p. 84,
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintlhttp://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl/vol15/iss1/11
.
116
Papadakis, p. 85.

66
making up more than 70 percent of the population, the issue of political representation and
minority rights is paramount the Turkish Cypriots.
Noting this, it would be difficult to imagine a situation where a de facto state that seceded
from a parent state, with aid from a patron state of the same ethnic makeup, would willingly vote
to reintegrate with the same parent state. This is not an event that can fully be explained by
identity, which would expect the Turkish Cypriot side to remain intransigent. The issue of how
identity shapes the intractability of the Cyprus Problem cannot be overscored, but a watershed
moment occurred in 2004 (on the side of Northern Cyprus) that warrants a more complete
explanation that adds to the already rich studies of ethnic conflict on the island. Furthermore, the
Annan Plan was not an agreement that only the Northern Cyprus government agreed to, it was a
plan voted on by 65 percent of the Turkish Cypriot population, which underlines an element of
agency within the population.
Bringing the international system back in, the Annan Plan and entrance into the European
Union promised to reverse the fortunes for those in the north.117 The unrelenting embargo
imposed by the Republic of Cyprus meant that all trade needed to be rerouted to Turkey. In
addition, the footing of Northern Cyprus rested solely on how Turkey was doing. This meant that
any economic downturn for Turkey spelled similar economic disaster for Northern Cyprus. The
theory (which serves as a partial explanation) put forth in this dissertation, is not meant to
disregard the identity-based arguments, which generally center around the uncompromising
demands of both sides. Rather, the state capacity argument for Northern Cyprus shows that the
economic gaps on the island were too big to ignore by the Turkish Cypriots. The next sections

117

For more on the Annan Plan, see: Crisis Group, “Cyprus: Three Advantages of the Annan Peace Plan,”
Crisis GroupCrisis Group, 2004,
https://web.archive.org/web/20210315025941/https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/westerneuropemediterranean/cyprus/cyprus-three-advantages-annan-peace-plan.

67
describe in detail the balance of state capacity between both sides, and why ultimately the
economic and administrative gaps made it feasible for the de facto state to endorse reintegration.

Military Capacity
In this section I will compare the differences between the military capacity of Northern
Cyprus versus that of the parent state, the Republic of Cyprus. Due to the strong support of
Turkey, Northern Cyprus is militarily stronger than its parent state, Cyprus. This has allowed the
status quo to persist on the island for almost five decades. Military capacity is used as a
foundation on which to establish a de facto state, but it does not account for the differing
preferences of the Turkish Cypriots. After all, they are militarily stronger than their parent state
throughout each year from 1974-2004, yet they still voted to reintegrate.
A cursory glance at the military capacity of the de facto states in question gives a general
idea on where they stand in comparison to the parent state. In the case of Northern Cyprus, while
military personnel is lower than the Republic of Cyprus pre 2004 (5,000 military personnel vs.
an average of about 12,000), this does not include the presence of Turkish military on the island,
which number about 30,000.118 As a patron, Turkey also provides weaponry, foreign military
advisors, training for de facto state troops, as well as soldiers.119 Turkey’s soldiers and patronage
mean that they essentially control the northern part of the island and tip the (military) balance of
power in favor of the Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that when comparing
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the military capacity of Northern Cyprus vs. the Republic of Cyprus, the TRNC comes out on
top. Florea supports this assertion, as he codes the relative (rebel) capability as much stronger.120
Exactly how does military capacity break down in the divided Cypriot island? The first
chart below gives the number of military personnel (in thousands) that Northern Cyprus (TRNC)
and Cyprus each had for each year from 1974-2003. Northern Cyprus itself did not have more
military personnel than the Republic of Cyprus, with a reported 5,000 personnel for each year
from 1974-2003.121 However, this graph, and the data on which it is based, misses crucial
information and presents an inaccurate picture of the military situation on the island since 1974.
The reason that the status quo persisted for so long is due to the fact that the Republic of Cyprus
cannot legitimately claim control over the northern part of the island. After Turkey invaded the
northern part of the island (Kyrenia) in 1974, they left a substantial military presence that
ensured control of what is now Northern Cyprus, although were deterred from taking more of the
island thanks to UN and British forces.
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Figure 3.3: Military Personnel (Thousands) Northern Cyprus and Cyprus
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The figure above shows the number of active military personnel for both Northern
Cyprus and Cyprus. For Northern Cyprus, the figures reported only take into account soldiers
from Northern Cyprus. Turkish soldiers are not included. Up until 2004, Northern Cyprus had
less of their soldiers providing security compared to Cyprus.122 The sheer imbalance in regard to
military personnel available to Northern Cyprus vs that available to Cyprus makes it clear why
the Northern Cypriot de facto state exists.
In order to present a more accurate picture of the number of military personnel available
to Northern Cyprus vs the Republic of Cyprus, it is necessary to include the Northern Cypriot
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personnel alongside the Turkish military personnel. In addition to the 5,000 Northern Cypriot
military personnel, there are about 30,000 Turkish troops stationed on the northern part of the
island for every year between 1974-2003.123 If this is added to the troops that TRNC themselves
provides, then it is clear to see why the military capacity is higher compared to the Republic of
Cyprus. For example, take the year 1995. The Republic of Cyprus is listed as having 10,000,
while Northern Cyprus only has 5,000 of their own troops on the northern part of the island.
However, once Turkish troops are taken into account, Northern Cyprus really has 35,000 troops
at their disposal, compared to Cyprus’ 10,000.
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Figure 3.4: Northern Cyprus Military Personnel with Patron Support (Thousands)
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After number of military personnel, the amount spend on military expenditure is also
crucial to examine. The next tables and figures will focus on total military expenditure, and
military expenditure as a percentage of GDP. As I show later, even though the Republic of
Cyprus spends a larger percentage of their GDP on defense as compared to Northern Cyprus, it is
not enough to counteract the number of Turkish soldiers defending the northern part of the
island. The Republic of Cyprus is not ever able to credibly challenge the Turkish presence on the
island. For reference, I present one table and one figure that denotes total military expenditure by
Northern Cyprus and Cyprus.
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Table 3.1: Total Military Expenditure in Northern Cyprus and Cyprus124
Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

124

Northern Cyprus

Cyprus

$8 million
$5 million
$5 million
$8 million
$15 million
$14 million
$5 million
$7 million
$7 million
$7 million
$7 million
$6 million
$6 million
$8 million
$11 million
$12 million
$11 million
$10 million
$16 million
$15 million
$28 million
$42 million
$53 million
$39 million
$30 million
$36 million
$46 million
$55 million

$30 million
$50 million
$200 million
$240 million
$240 million
$410 million
$420 million
$630 million
$270 million
$300 million
$300 million
$450 million
$530 million
$480 million
$290 million
$280 million
$330 million
$240 million
$290 million
$340 million

For Northern Cyprus figures, original sources were in Turkish Lira. To approximate to the US dollar
amount, I converted Turkish Lira (YTL) to US dollar using the conversion rate for each year. Conversion
figures were taken from the TRNC State Planning Committee and were verified with open-source online
information and were found to be adequate approximations. The Cyprus military expenditure figures were
converted from billions of dollars. All figures were rounded to the nearest whole number.
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Figure 3.5: Total Military Expenditure (Millions) Northern Cyprus and Cyprus
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Figure 3.6 below shows military expenditure as a percentage of GDP for Northern
Cyprus (TRNC) vs. the Republic of Cyprus. The reason to use military expenditure as a
percentage of GDP is because the economies of Northern Cyprus and Cyprus are quite distinct in
terms of size. Therefore, capturing only the total military expenditure would hide some of the
context. Comparing the percentage of GDP gives insight into how both states approach defense
spending.
Overall, Cyprus is spending a larger percentage of their GDP on defense up until the late
1990s. This is not surprising, seeing as Turkey is providing Northern Cyprus with troops and
economic aid to boost their military capacity. Cyprus had to bolster its military enough to protect
the Greek-majority community in the south, and stave off Turkey and Northern Cyprus.
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Additionally, 1988 saw the collapse of talks (again) between both sides when Cyprus signaled its
intentions to apply to the European Community (EC), further increasing tensions. Then, in 1994,
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) delivered a landmark ruling in Loizidou v. Turkey
that essentially named Turkey as an occupying force on the island and said that all refugees have
the right to return to their former homes. The case specifically centered around a Greek-Cypriot
refugee that was displaced in 1974 from her home in Kyrenia, located in the north of the
island.125 Ankara did not welcome the ruling. At the same time, we see Cyprus increasing its
military expenditure during this tense time period. While North Cyprus military expenditure is
comparatively lower during this time, Turkey is still providing up to 30,000 soldiers per year,
making it likely that North Cyprus does not need to increase its own military expenditure
significantly, although there is an increase during this time for Northern Cyprus.
While data is not available for Cypriot military expenditure before 1985, military
expenditure peaked for Northern Cyprus in the late 1970s – early 1980s (at around seven
percent). This would be the time after the Turkish invasion (1974), but before their declaration of
independence (1983). 1999 sees another uptick, at around 5 percent.
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Figure 3.6: Military Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP in Northern Cyprus and
Cyprus126
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In addition to the soldiers and aid that the Turkey provides, Northern Cyprus receives
other forms of military support from their patron. Florea finds that Turkish military support for
Northern Cyprus is overall very high. Specifically, he finds that Turkey contributes weaponry,
foreign military personnel, foreign military advisors, and training for de facto states troops.127 An
ordinal measure of relative rebel capacity finds that Northern Cyprus is considered much
stronger than the government of Cyprus militarily, and this can be attributed almost entirely to
Turkish support.128 The ordinal measure runs from 1 to 4. A 1 indicates the de facto state is
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weaker than the government, a 2 indicates parity with the government, a 3 indicates the de facto
state is stronger than the government, and a 4 indicates that the de facto state is much stronger
than the government.

Table 3.2: Types of External Military Support Turkey Provides Northern Cyprus129
Support Type
Weaponry
Foreign Soldiers
Foreign Military Advisors
Training for Troops
Safe Havens

Provided by Turkey
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Economic and Administrative Capacity
Prior to the 2004 vote on reunification, the economy of Northern Cyprus resembled that
of a developing nation, while the economy of the Republic of Cyprus resembled that of a
developed nation. Northern Cyprus, due to the embargo put in place by the Republic of Cyprus,
could only receive aid from Turkey, its sole patron. For example, by 2003, the GDP per capita in
Northern Cyprus was nearly four times lower than its southern neighbor on the same island.130
Northern Cyprus had a GDP per capita of $5,949 while the Republic of Cyprus had a GDP per
capita of $20,000. Nonrecognition and economic isolation meant that Northern Cyprus lagged far
behind the Republic of Cyprus in terms of economic capacity. This in turn affected its state
building, institutions, and administrative capacity. Without robust economic development,
Northern Cyprus prioritized security in its earlier years. While the military capacity of Northern
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Cyprus could hold its own against the parent state (thanks to extensive patron support), economic
and administrative capacity lagged behind. Even with Turkey’s aid, nonrecognition and isolation
did damage and stunted the potential growth of the Turkish Cypriots. This section presents
various indicators of economic and administrative capacity for Northern Cyprus and
demonstrates that these indicators lag far behind the parent state.

GDP and GDP per Capita Comparison
Before comparing relative standard of living using per capita income, it is important to
compare the size of the economies outright. This will show the different trajectories of both sides
of the island following the events of 1974. For this case specifically, it shows the Republic of
Cyprus developing into a high-income country, culminating with its entrance into the European
Union. Northern Cyprus, on the other hand, was reliant on Turkey from 1974-2004 for most of
its economic needs, including for trade and tourism.131 Generally, the comparison will provide a
real-world example of the costs of nonrecognition and isolation. Even with the presence of a
strong patron, North Cyprus could never hope to catch up to its southern neighbor without access
to international markets.
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Figure 3.7: GDP Comparison in Northern Cyprus and Cyprus132
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Figure 3.7 (above) shows a graph of the GDP for both parts of the island. The Cypriot
economy dwarfs the TRNC economy early on. By 1977, when figures for both are available, the
GDP of Cyprus is more than three times that of Northern Cyprus. Cyprus surpasses the 1-billiondollar mark in 1979, while the GDP of Northern Cyprus does not break 1 billion dollars until
2000. That is thirty-one years to catch up to this 1979 figure, and by this point, the GDP of
Cyprus is more than nine times that of the TRNC. By 2004, the year of the vote on the Annan
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Plan, the Cypriot GDP is roughly 17.3 billion dollars, while the GDP of Northern Cyprus is
valued at 1.7 billion dollars.
Comparing GDP is a useful start, but not enough to show the magnitude of the economic
capacity disparity between Cyprus and Northern Cyprus. I compare GDP per capita in Figure 3.8
(shown below) to show the relative standard of living between both populations on the islands. In
1977, when data is available for both, the GDP per capita for Cyprus was $1,476.27, while the
GDP per capita for Northern Cyprus was $1,430.66. At this point, the GDP per capita for both
areas are virtually identical. Even though the total GDP is much higher for Cyprus, Northern
Cyprus has a much lower population. In 1977, the population of Cyprus sat at 655,525, while the
population of Northern Cyprus was 145,000. But the differences in GDP per capita really start
showing around the time that Northern Cyprus declares independence, in 1983. At this point, the
GDP per capita of Cyprus has risen to $4,091.05, while the GDP per capita of Northern Cyprus
is $1,287.73, which is actually lower than the 1977 figure. This means that in six years, the GDP
per capita between the north and the south went from virtually identical to Cyprus having a GDP
per capita over three times that of Northern Cyprus. This is due mainly to the economic embargo
that Cyprus imposed over the northern part of the island, and convinced the rest of the world to
partake in.
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Figure 3.8: GDP per Capita Comparison Northern Cyprus and Cyprus
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Tax Revenue Comparison
Another factor that goes into economic capacity concerns whether states and
unrecognized states are able to effectively tax their populations (collect revenue) and use this
revenue for state building. According to the OECD, “It can be regarded as one measure of the
degree to which the government controls the economy's resources”.133 Tax revenue includes
taxes on: income, profits, social security, goods and services, payroll, ownership and transfer of
property, and other taxes.134 States unable to collect adequate revenue will have consequences
not only for the economy, but for security, and providing goods and services to its population.
States able to collect enough revenue to fund their state goals are most likely to have a
sophisticated apparatus and institutions that ensure money is collected efficiently and used for
intended purposes.

133

“Tax Revenue,” OECD Data, 2019,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200902182613/https://data.oecd.org/tax/tax-revenue.htm.
134
“Tax Revenue.”

81
In this section, I compare tax revenue as a percentage of GDP between the Republic of
Cyprus and Northern Cyprus. What percentage of the GDP is coming from taxes? Notably, tax
revenue as a percentage of GDP does not include foreign aid, which makes up a substantial
portion of Northern Cyprus’ budget and GDP (this will be discussed in the following section).
Tax revenue percentages are readily available for recognized states from the World Bank,
but less readily available for de facto states. In order to approximate the tax revenue percentages
for Northern Cyprus, I use statistics available from the TRNC State Planning Organization. In
Figure 3.9 below, I find that overall (from 1977-2004), the Republic of Cyprus has a higher
percentage of their GDP that comes from tax revenues, whereas Northern Cyprus has a lower
percentage of their GDP that comes from tax revenues.135 For both, as their economies grow, so
does their tax revenue as a percentage. The largest gap is apparent in the 2000s, where the
Republic of Cyprus has a tax revenue percentage ranging from 35-37%, while Northern Cyprus
sits at 16-20%. Northern Cyprus has a lower tax revenue primarily due to the fact that Turkish
economic aid makes up a large portion of the budget, and additionally, revenue-collecting
resources may not be as advanced as on the southern part of the island.
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In 1987 and 1988, Northern Cyprus had a slightly higher tax revenue as a percentage of GDP
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17.39%.
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Figure 3.9: Tax Revenue Comparison as a Percentage of GDP in Northern Cyprus and
Cyprus
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Turkish Aid to Northern Cyprus
Total economic aid from Turkey to Northern Cyprus totaled around 1.06 billion US
dollars from 1974-2004, according to figures reported by TRNC State Planning Organization. On
average, Turkey sent 38 million US dollars each year to their compatriots on the northern part of
the island. Unsurprisingly, the economy of Northern Cyprus is extremely reliant on Turkey and
the Turkish Lira has been the currency since shortly after 1974. This means that economic crises
in Turkey have affected the TRNC as well. For example, the TRNC suffered currency instability
and high inflation during the 2000-2001 Turkish economic crises.136
As the primary provider of economic aid to Northern Cyprus during the period of 19742004, Turkish aid represents a significant portion of the TRNC budget. Feridun notes that
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Turkish aid represents 15-35% of the budget of Northern Cyprus.137 My calculations support this
assertion for the time period I examine. I find that Turkish economic aid accounts for an average
of 22% of the budget from 1977-2004. The lowest year was in 1990, with 11% of the budget,
while the highest year was in 1984, with 35% of the budget. The figure below represents these
percentages visually.

Figure 3.10: Turkish Economic Aid to Northern Cyprus as a Percentage of Total Budget
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Institutions and State Building Over Time
As a long-standing de facto state (since 1974), Northern Cyprus has the advantage of
time, meaning it had most of the institutions in place that recognized states possess. Decades of
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existence as a de facto state allowed state building to grow, despite economic isolation imposed
by the south, and reliance on its patron, Turkey. On the other hand, as a recognized state, the
Republic of Cyprus had no need to create new institutions after the loss of the northern part of
the island. Additionally, a big cause of the gap in administrative capacity came from the fact that
Northern Cyprus was unable to effectively trade or have relations with any other state (besides
Turkey). Cyprus was effective in shutting out Northern Cyprus, and unlike in the case of other de
facto states (such as Taiwan, Somaliland, Transnistria), the international community was firm in
its isolation. Nonrecognition itself is problematic, but other de fact states have found ways
around it. Isolation, on the other hand, to the degree that Northern Cyprus experienced, had a
much more pernicious effect on the de facto state’s ability to grow economically and invest in its
institutions.
A count revels that Northern Cyprus possesses all the institutions that recognized states
have.138 In the transitional period between 1974-1983, when the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus had not yet been declared, Northern Cyprus had 9/10 institutions, and by 1983, it had
added foreign affairs. It is important to note that even though foreign affairs and diplomatic
overtures were made by the newly declared de facto states, it did not mean they could avail
themselves of them, as the Republic of Cyprus had been effective in convincing the rest of the
world on thoroughly ignoring Northern Cyprus.
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Table 3.3: Institutions in Northern Cyprus139
Year Established
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1983

Institution
Executive System
Legislature
Legal System
Tax System
Education System
Welfare System
Media
Police
Banking System
Foreign Affairs

With institutions in place, how well did Northern Cyprus implement the tools of state
building? At its inception, Northern Cyprus had only a moderate degree of state building. This
meant that it had most institutions in place, save for diplomatic affairs, but nevertheless there
existed a modicum of resources for basic governance. It could be said that the early years of
TRNC de facto statehood were not overly focused on building state institutions for the purposes
of legitimacy, but rather to ensure separation from the parent state. Additionally, the conflict
between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots was still very much a “hot” conflict, meaning that
security took a higher priority.
After the declaration of independence in 1983, state building evolved to a higher level,
with TRNC authorities putting more resources into extraction (taxation) and redistribution, as
well as investment into other civilian structures, such as education and welfare. Due to continued
nonrecognition and pariah status from the international community, Northern Cyprus was still
not able to build a robust diplomatic presence and had to continue to rely on Turkey not only for
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military support, but also economic support. Since I look at the period up to the Annan Plan vote
in 2004, my comparison of administrative capacity will reflect that.140 For the time period up to
2004, Northern Cyprus had a decidedly lower level of administrative capacity than its neighbor
to the south, the Republic of Cyprus.
The administrative capacity of Northern Cyprus is quite high for a de facto state, but it is
lower than the Republic of Cyprus. This development gap is often attributed to nonrecognition
and economic isolation of TRNC.141 What economic isolation and nonrecognition do is hinder
economic growth. In turn, this affects institution building and goal setting by the de facto state,
which leads to a lower administrative capacity.
From 1974-1982, Northern Cyprus was regarded as having a moderate degree of state
building capacity. This is the period in which Turkish forces took over 1/3 of the island and
ended with the declaration of independence in 1983. A moderate degree of state building means
that the de facto state controls the territory, provides physical security, and allocate resources for
civilian governance. This means that some funds, though not many, are given to areas of public
administration, education, health, and other welfare systems.142 Why did Northern Cyprus start
out at a moderate degree of state building and not low? Prior to the split, both communities were
already quite ethnically divided. Unlike other de facto states that needed to build a state from the
ground up, Northern Cyprus had some of the requirements necessary to function, like police and
media.
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From 1983-2003, Northern Cyprus had a high degree of state building. A high degree of
state building means that more sophisticated means of extraction and redistribution are expected,
as well as internal security (not just external), courts, and ministries.143 After “officially”
becoming a de facto state in 1983, Northern Cyprus was able to invest more into government
structures. It is unclear whether the increased state building prompted the declaration of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, or whether the declaration itself spurred the government
to increase its administrative capacity.
Notably, during this time period (1974-2004), Northern Cyprus does not achieve the
highest measure of state building, “very high”. As one of the more advanced de facto states, why
is this the case? To achieve a “very high” degree of state building, a de facto state must be able
to conduct “external relations, have representative offices abroad (pseudo-embassies), and
commercial relations with international partners”.144 Even though institutions that serve their
own populations may be present and robust, internal affairs are not the end all and be all of
states, recognized or otherwise. In order to grow, expand, and serve its citizens more effectively,
de facto states need the ability to interact with the outside world, and this was not possible for
Northern Cyprus for many years. By imposing isolation and ensuring all but one state followed
suit, the Republic of Cyprus ensured that Northern Cyprus would never become a truly
functional or viable state.
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Table 3.4: State Building Over Time in Northern Cyprus
Year
Degree of State Building
1974-1982 Moderate
1983- 2003 High

Income Classification: High Income vs. Middle Income
The World Bank classifies countries into four income categories: low income, lowermiddle income, upper-middle income, and higher income. The Republic of Cyprus is classified
as an upper middle-income country in 1987, and then a high-income country from 1988-2004.145
The goal of this section is to determine the income classification of Northern Cyprus, which is
not available, being an unrecognized state. Income classification is determined by calculating the
gross national income (GNI) per capita. GNI is determined by adding GDP plus income from
overseas sources. For Northern Cyprus, this means specifically GDP plus Turkish economic aid.

Northern Cyprus Income classification = (GDP + Turkish economic aid) / population

Each year, the World Bank publishes the GNI per capita necessary to fall into each
category. To calculate the income classification standing for Northern Cyprus, I added the total
GDP plus economic aid, converted from Turkish Lira to US Dollar for each year, then divided by
the population for each year. Then I compared the GNI per capita for Northern Cyprus to the
income brackets the World Bank provides for classification into either low income, lower middle
income, upper middle income, or high income.
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Table 3.5 (below) shows Northern Cyprus would classify as an “Upper Middle Income”
country under the World Bank classification system.146 As Cyprus is classified as a “High
Income” country, we can see that both sides of the islands had different economic outcomes
following the creating of the de facto state on the north of the island.

Table 3.5: Income Classification for Northern Cyprus
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

146

$2,152.43
$2,107.31
$2,582.41
$3,539.42
$3,246.27
$3,448.16
$3,621.52
$3,157.92
$4,265.24
$4,616.19
$4,064.93
$4,672.03
$4,979.86
$5,458.98
$4,533.53
$4,725.59
$6,367.34
$8,454.10

Upper Middle
Lower Middle
Upper Middle
Upper Middle
Upper Middle
Upper Middle
Upper Middle
Upper Middle
Upper Middle
Upper Middle
Upper Middle
Upper Middle
Upper Middle
Upper Middle
Upper Middle
Upper Middle
Upper Middle
Upper Middle

Except for 1988, when it would be a Lower Middle-Income country.
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The Enticement of the European Union
Membership in the European Union was one of the greatest enticers for the Turkish
Cypriot community to embrace Annan V and vote towards reunification.147 The Turkish Cypriot
community was eager to bear the costs of reunification as this would result in increased GDP,
more trade, freedom of movement, more employment opportunities, and the use of the Euro.148
As shown with previous tables and graphs, the economy of Cyprus was in an enviable position
compared to Northern Cyprus, and was set to reap even more benefits in the EU, which would
further widen the economic gap between the north and the south of the island. The Annan Plan
provided for the earliest possible convergence of the two islands under a federal roof.149
Reunification would also create fast and sustainable growth for both constituent states on the
island. This was calculated to be a GDP growth of about 5-5.5% for the south and 7.5% for the
north from a 5-10 year period.150

Economic and Administrative Capacity Review
When it comes to economic and administrative capacity, the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus is comparatively weaker than the Republic of Cyprus. This can be mainly
attributed to nonrecognition and economic isolation, which in turn led to decreased economic
power and state building. Since the Turkish invasion in 1974, the Republic of Cyprus has been
successful in making sure that the TRNC is unable to interact economically with the global
community and making them reliant one only one state: Turkey. While having a strong patron
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provides benefits to Northern Cyprus, in the form of military and economic aid, this also means
that Northern Cyprus is vulnerable to the ebbs and flows of the Turkish economy. Furthermore,
Northern Cyprus cannot trade its goods with the rest of the world directly. They must all pass
through Turkey first.
Lower economic and administrative capacity between Cyprus and Northern Cyprus is
evident on several fronts. First, I find a large gap between both economies in terms of total GDP
and GDP per capita. Quite simply, residents in the north have a much smaller pie (total GDP) to
take from, and their cut of pie is also much smaller (GDP per capita), even though there is a
much smaller population. Additionally, compared to Cyprus, Northern Cyprus does not obtain as
much tax revenue from its citizens. As a result of limited revenue streams, Northern Cyprus
relies on Turkey to supplement and make up a large portion of its annual budget. Without this
aid, it is unclear how viable the Turkish Cypriot de facto state would be.
While Northern Cyprus possesses all the institutions of a state, the early years did not
prove to be a time of high-level state building, which meant that more resources had to be used
for security. This meant that other public goods and services went without, which comes up short
when compared to the Republic of Cyprus. Even once Northern Cyprus achieved a “high” degree
of state building, it still suffered the effects of nonrecognition and isolation in that no other state
would interact with them on the international arena.
In terms of how to classify the two economies, the Republic of Cyprus once again comes
out on top, being rated as a “High Income” country. While de facto states are not included in
World Bank data, where these income classifications occur, I nevertheless calculated the
required elements for Northern Cyprus to determine their place in world economies. Northern
Cyprus would be a step below the income classification ladder, being rated “High Middle
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Income” for the period from 1987-2004. Once again, Turkish economic aid plays a large role in
ensuring that Northern Cyprus is at this level, and not lower.
With economic differences thoroughly compared, it is easy to see why the enticement of
European Union membership played a large role in convincing the resounding majority of
Turkish Cypriots to vote towards reunification. Reunification coupled with EU membership
would mean that the economic gap between both parts of the island would start to close, and
make sure that citizens in the north could strive towards a higher standard of living.

Conclusion and Policy Implications in the Cyprus Problem and Beyond
This chapter has highlighted the case of Northern Cyprus. What prompted the shift from
a pro-independence to a pro-reintegration stance? Specifically, why was Northern Cyprus willing
to give up their hard-fought de facto statehood in exchange for becoming one part of a federal
state? In sum, the Northern Cyprus’ isolation and economic situation made it so that the benefits
of becoming a federal state and joining the European Union outweighed the costs of giving up
military security provided by Turkey. This is evidenced by the vote on the Annan Plan and the
presidential election, which both reaffirmed the willingness to solve the Cyprus Problem.
Policy implications can be derived from this case. Mainly, it concerns the future of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In interviews with government officials, it was my
impression that the status-quo was the preferred option for now because neither side has a
burning desire to reunify.151 Cyprus has no desire to cooperate since they are part of the EU now.
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Interviews with officials from Northern Cyprus took place from 14-20 May 2019 with former and
current government officials. Interviews took place in various locations across Northern Cyprus and the
Republic of Cyprus: Eastern Mediterranean University in Famagusta, Northern Cyprus, a furniture store
in Lefkosa, a restaurant in Lefkosa, and the border zone between the north and the south. In addition to
these interviews, the author had prior and follow up communications over email.
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Even though Greek Cypriots voted against the deal, they were still rewarded with EU
membership. The international community rewarded Northern Cyprus somewhat, in that aid was
released to the northern part of the island by the EU, and more trade now occurs between the
north and the south. Residents of both parts of the island can now travel to and from and Turkish
Cypriots can apply for EU passports and work in the south. The population itself is ambivalent
about reunification now owing to the amount of time passed between the failure of Annan V and
the present.
Furthermore, the energy dispute from 2018 regarding the exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
of Cyprus has now ensnared Turkey, Greece, and Northern Cyprus.152 Turkey, acting on behalf
of Northern Cyprus, has started drilling in the area. Northern Cyprus, as a self-declared state,
believes it has a right to explore the region for energy, just as the Republic of Cyprus does. All of
my interview subjects stressed that the energy crisis was a negative in regard to solving the
Cyprus Problem, and would most likely worsen tensions, not improve them. While the future
does not look particularly bright, it is worth exploring the conditions under which Northern
Cyprus was willing to be part of a federal system. In the same vein, this can also be viewed as a
case where development and growth can occur even without recognition, even considering
substantial barriers.
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Chapter 4: Taiwan and the Status Quo
In this chapter, I show that Taiwan’s strategy for sovereignty, continuing the status quo,
emerges as a result of the state capacity relationship with its hostile parent state, China. While
Taiwan may win out on several key economic and administrative indicators, namely GDP per
capita and income classification, it is nowhere near enough to overshadow the massive economic
might of mainland China. Furthermore, Taiwan’s military capacity as compared to China is
dwarfed in every category, with the gap only looking to increase in the coming years. Taiwan’s
saving grace is the relationship with its patron state, the United States. The support of the United
States through military aid and promises to aid Taiwan in a potential invasion make it costly for
China to take action to win back the wayward province through military means. While the
United States’ support is substantial and necessary, it does not itself extend recognition to
Taiwan, due to the potential for this to ignite tensions with China.
Despite material capabilities coming up short against the parent state, Taiwan is not willing
to acquiesce to a reintegration with China. Decades of de facto statehood mean that Taiwan has
carved out its own existence and character on the world stage. While China wages a fierce
derecognition campaign against the island, Taiwan nevertheless enjoys recognition from a
handful of states, as well as membership or observer status in several international organizations.
The most striking difference between the mainland and the island would have to be their political
systems. On one hand, Taiwan is a consolidated democracy, enjoying the highest level of
freedoms in Asia, and in fact the world. China, on the other hand, is an authoritarian regime
notorious for its lack of political freedoms and propagation of human rights abuses. While
Taiwan’s history as a state, and then a de facto state, includes an authoritarian past, they now
have free and fair elections, and peaceful transfers of power between the two main political
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parties. These startling differences have resulted in Taiwanese society etching out a Taiwanese
identity, one wholly separate and complete from those on the mainland. In turn, this contributes
to the attitudes that reject unification. Most of the Taiwanese public and political leaders are
aware of the risk that a declaration of independence would bring, however. Therefore,
pragmatism, and a willingness to avoid a hot conflict with China, make the status quo the most
attractive option for now.

Theory: Taiwan’s Status Quo Spectrum
The 2020 presidential elections in Taiwan gave incumbent Tsai Ing-wen and the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) a second term, and more importantly, showed that residents of the
island backed her tough China stance, which looked to reject the “One Country, Two Systems”
Hong Kong model proposed by Xi Jingping. Tsai Ing-wen won the election with the most ever
votes, buoyed in part by the campaign’s focus on issues of sovereignty, democracy, rejection of
the 1992 consensus, and the role of the Hong Kong anti-government protests (Kao and Chang
2020).153 Voters thoroughly rejected the Kuomintang (KMT) candidate, Han Kuo-yu, who ran a
more mainland-friendly campaign.
Polls taken over the last two decades show that a majority of Taiwanese reject the premise of
unification with China, despite China’s rising influence on the world stage. A 2005 poll
conducted by the Mainland Affairs Council found that 31 percent of respondents want the status
quo to continue, with a decision on Taiwan’s status made down the line. 25.8 percent of
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Council on Foreign Relations, January 22,
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respondents wanted the status quo indefinitely, and 21.7 percent want to keep the status quo now,
and pursue independence down the line. Together, this means that 78.5 percent of respondents
prefer the status quo, at least in the present.154 Even with more choices presented, a majority of
Taiwanese respondents prefer the status quo to other choices. Notably, Chinese pressure on
countries to revoke Taiwanese recognition, protests in Hong Kong, and authoritarian actions
within China make it so that the majority of Taiwanese feel like the Chinese system is
incompatible with a now democratic Taiwan.
In 2017, pollsters found that three quarters of Taiwanese people consider Taiwan and China
separate countries, with most of these respondents preferring eventual independence or status
quo.155 A 2018 poll showed that 38.3 percent favored independence, 24.1 percent were satisfied
with the status quo, while 20.1 percent favored unification.156 Remarkably, this showed a 12.9
percent decrease in support for independence since 2016, which meant that support for
independence had a 51.2 percent preference just two years earlier.157 Moreover, a majority of
citizens favor an independence referendum.158 Recent polls support the previous trends, with the
main takeaway being that cross-strait relations and international events are driving forces behind
the Taiwanese rejection of unification.
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Taiwan Status Quo Model
Taiwan’s preference for the status quo arises for several reasons. First, the state capacity
comparisons between Taiwan and China reveal strengths and weaknesses for both sides. China’s
military power and spending is much higher than Taiwan’s, but patron support from the United
States means that Taiwan is at parity, for now. The economic and administrative capacity picture
is mixed, with China coming out ahead in total economic indicators, and Taiwan coming up
higher in quality-of-life indicators. In addition to material capabilities, the Taiwanese populace
and leaders are also driven by their desire to carve out a separate Taiwanese identity. This is
compounded by the two territories’ complete divergence in political systems: one a democracy,
another an autocracy.
Material capabilities, coupled with diverging systems leads to a preference against
unification. In all, there are three general strategies or preferences for Taiwan (or any de facto
state really): (re)unification with the parent state, status quo, or independence. Polls show that an
overwhelming majority of Taiwanese prefer either: 1) status quo in some form (most popular
option, or 2) declaration of independence, either now or down the line. However, political
leaders of both major parties are aware that a declaration of independence would trigger a crisis
at best, and a war at worst. Therefore, status quo becomes the most viable, and pursued option.
Below I present a figure that illustrates Taiwan’s model of status quo preference. It
begins with state capacity and diverging systems. This makes it so that a preference against
unification is the most preferred option. It would be easy to stop there and write about why
Taiwan is not interested in unifying with China in light of their rising power. However, the fact
that the Taiwanese so thoroughly reject unification as an option means that another question is
more interesting: why status quo when the Taiwanese identity and system is so different from
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China? The last part of the illustration shows that even though the overall preference is against
unification, the status quo is the most viable option for leaders in order to prevent conflict from
China. This arises due state capacity differentials, diverging systems, and China’s position on the
world stage. This includes it being a member of the P5, ensuring that any application for full
membership would be vetoed.

Figure 4.1: Taiwan Model for Status Quo

State Capacity,
Diverging
Systems

Preference
Against
Unification

Status Quo In
Order To Prevent
Conflict

The first thing to note about the strategy of continuing to pursue the status quo is that it is
foremost a rejection of unification with mainland China. Most Taiwanese consider themselves to
have a separate identity than mainlanders, and their approval of the current democratic system in
place is in stark contrast to the authoritarian regime in China. Rejecting unification means that
the remaining choices are either independence or the status quo.
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Second, pursuing the status quo has occurred in a spectrum. Compared to the DPP, the KMT
is more conciliatory in its approach to China and is vehemently against a declaration of
independence. Their goal is to increase trade and economic interdependence with China, and
they accept the 1992 consensus as a starting point for any future negotiations with the Chinese
government.
The DPP in contrast, rejects the 1992 consensus that posits that Taiwan is part of “One
China”, which leaves the possibility for Taiwanese independence on the table. In January 2019,
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen responded to Chinese President Xi Jingping’s message to
Taiwan, which called for the “One Country, Two Systems approach”.159 In this speech, President
Tsai Ing-wen rejects this proposal, and further states that “they” have never accepted the 1992
Consensus. ” They” in this case being the DPP. She also claims that the DPP’s opposition to the
1992 Consensus arises in part because most Taiwanese also reject the premise of the 1992
Consensus and do not agree with it. However, in the present, they do not wish to unilaterally
change the status of Taiwan. The DPP represents the other end of the spectrum of status quo, one
that is sure-footed in its defense of Taiwanese democracy and place in the world.
Overall, most Taiwanese prefer the status quo, and the two major parties in some way
support the continuation of it. The situation with China, the parent state, makes it so that status
quo is the best option in order to prevent a conflict. The decision to keep pursuing the status quo,
which leaves Taiwan without recognition from most states, and actively fighting further
derecognition does not arise due to low state capacity on Taiwan’s part—in fact, Taiwan’s state
capacity rivals and beats most recognized states. Taiwan does not suffer the pariah status of other
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de facto states. Its economy is not merely viable, it is the 5th largest in Asia and 15th in the
world.160 And at 23 million inhabitants, it can hardly be considered a microstate, like South
Ossetia or Nagorno-Karabakh. Rather, the preference for status quo arises due to the relationship
with its parent state. Without China, Taiwan would no doubt thrive as a normal, recognized state,
with all the frills and bows that brings. A conflict with China would not only threaten Taiwan’s
physical security, but likely its economic security as well, as the mainland is Taiwan’s largest
trading partner (at 30 percent), leading to an increasing level of economic interdependence.
Although Taiwan has sought to diversity their investments with other states, trade between
Taiwan and China was still a high $150.5 billion in 2018.161

The United States and Taiwan
In 1979, eight years following the loss of Taiwan’s UN seat, the United States undertook
two actions: it signed the Taiwan Relations Act in law and issued a joint communique that
affirmed the People’s Republic of China as the legitimate government. These two actions set the
precedent for the United States – Taiwan relationship that stands today. The latter, in addition to
affirming the People’s Republic of China legitimacy, also stated that there is one China, and that
Taiwan was part of China.162 By recognizing China as the legitimate authority, this at the same
time meant derecognition for Taiwan, who now had to contend with life as a de facto state.
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Despite the official loss of U.S. support, there was the assertation that the United States
would continue to maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people
of Taiwan. This matters significantly, because it sets the United States – Taiwan relationship as
one of patron and unrecognized state. It makes apparent that the United States will continue to
support Taiwan, specifically in any action that China might undertake.
This commitment to Taiwan is bolstered in the Taiwan Relations Act. In it, the United
States stated that it would “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other
than peaceful means of grave concern to the United States ”.163 The law says the United
States can come to the aid of Taiwan, and allows for the sale of arms, but it is vague and
ambiguous on whether it actually would, or whether that commitment is bound into law.
This moderated both China and Taiwan’s behavior. It makes it so that both do not undertake
actions that might trigger a crisis: either military action or unilateral declaration of
independence. The United States also benefits because its “One China” policy ensures, to
the extent that it can credibly commit, stability and peace in the Asia-Pacific. This stability
and peace have directly translated to economic development for both China and Taiwan.164

Exploring Alternative Explanations for Taiwan’s Strategy
Like the case of Northern Cyprus, the issue of identity cannot be divorced completely from
Taiwan’s preference for status quo. While an alternative explanation, it serves to complement the
structural, state capacity theory.
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Taiwan’s identity as different from China can be traced to their different political systems
and practices. Despite being only eighty-one miles away from the coast of China, both territories
experience political life very distinctly. Taiwan’s democratic success has meant a different way
of life for citizens on the island, but it also serves to widen the differences with those on the
mainland. It makes China’s eventual goal of reunification more menacing, as it is difficult to
imagine how to integrate 23 million residents accustomed to democracy to an opposing system.
Furthermore, the Hong Kong experience of “One Country, Two Systems” has shown that this
method of government rule is fraught with problems and tensions, which could lead to violence.
“One Country, Two Systems” allows for some autonomous rule for Hong Kong, while
recognizing the “One China” policy. Taiwan has already rejected this offer of governance, and
this seems to be the largest concession that China would make.165 Even in Hong Kong, the “One
Country, Two Systems” is not meant to be permanent.
The transition to a consolidated democracy began in 1996, and since then Taiwan has
experienced three peaceful transfers of power between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the
Democratic People’s Party (DPP).166 Taiwan experienced authoritarian rule under the KMT
starting in 1945, and ending about four decades later, when the DPP, the main opposition party,
was allowed to participate in elections. Democratic transition occurred under the KMT due to a
variety of reasons, chief among them being economic development. Since then, Taiwan has
operated under a semi-presidential system, which elects a president every four years (eligible for
two terms), and also holds parliamentary elections.
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The Taiwanese people themselves highly favor a democratic system over an authoritarian
one. In 2010, 90 percent of respondents in the Asian Barometer polls reported that democracy
was still the best form of government, while 88 percent agreed in 2014.167 This is not to say that
democracy is not without issues, but it is preferred over other forms of government.
Authoritarian actions, such as getting rid of elections and having a “strong leader”, allowing only
one-party rule, or having the military govern the country were unpopular stances in Taiwan.
While Taiwan and China conduct trade and investment, the semblance of high-levels of
cross-Strait relationships has caused issues for Taiwan. In 2014, President Ma Ying-jeou’s plan
to have a trade pact with China led to the Sunflower movement.168 The protestors of the
Sunflower movement argued that increased economic and social relations with China would
create favorable conditions to eventual political integration.169 The Sunflower movement was
vital in establishing the way for the first term of Tsai Ing-wen, who promised to diversify
Taiwan’s trade and protect Taiwan’s democracy, while maintaining the current status quo in
cross-Strait relations.
Finally, the differences between Taiwan and China’s systems of government are readily
apparent in their Freedom House scores, which tracks political rights and civil liberties. Between
Taiwan and China, the differences could not be starker. From 1999-2019, Taiwan is rated as
“Free” every single year. China, from 1999-2019, is rated as “Not Free”, and records the second
highest score available for each year.170 This only further serves to amplify the gap apparent in
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democratic vs. authoritarian systems for Taiwan and China. In other words, what does the future
hold, as both territories drift further apart in how they govern? How far will the Taiwanese go in
protecting their democracy? And who ensures Taiwan’s future while China rises?
The issue of identity makes it very clear that the people of Taiwan, and the government
of Taiwan, have a strong disinclination to reunite with mainland China. However, it cannot fully
explain Taiwan’s status quo preference. Alone, the strong Taiwanese identity the de facto state
has carved out for itself might lead one to think that independence is the preference. This fails to
lay out the nuance of the relative capacity between Taiwan and China, and how that factors
heavily into Taiwan’s calculations. In the next sections, I highlight why Taiwan’s preference
leans towards status quo, rather than independence. This is because of the relative state capacity
between the de facto state and the parent state being precariously similar.

China’s Plans for the Future of Taiwan
Although China seemingly advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, they have
not, and likely will not, take military action off the table, and their modernization plans and
increasing capabilities only highlight this.171 They have never renounced the use of force as an
option to take back Taiwan. Additionally, they are not only increasing spending on traditional
military capabilities, but also putting it toward advanced military capabilities that would
necessitate a military campaign.
Furthermore, the 2005 passage of an Anti-Secession Law stated that force would be
acceptable in the event of a declaration of independence, and this law focuses exclusively on
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Taiwan, as well as resting heavily on the “One China” principle.172 2019 saw President Xi
Jingping reiterate this sentiment in a speech. In fact, he went even farther than to simply
condemn secessionist sentiment, by noting specifically that unification was the goal, and force
would be permissible.173 China has made it clear that a unilateral declaration of independence on
the part of Taiwan is their red line and would precipitate military action. While China is taking
steps to ensure that their military superiority over Taiwan deepens, it is unclear whether they will
only strike if a declaration of independence is made or if it will be when they believe they have
the most advantage.

Military Personnel
The Taiwanese military capacity at first glance also seems much weaker than its parent
state (China), looking only at raw numbers of military personnel--290,000 vs. over 2,000,000.174
A 2019 annual report to the United States Congress put the number closer to 140,000 for Taiwan,
while China was estimated at 1,020,000 ground troops, with 360,000 in the Taiwan Strait
Area.175 Like Northern Cyprus however, Taiwan has a strong patron in the United States that it
depends on for military support and aid. As a patron, the United States provides a high level of
military support with weaponry, foreign military personnel, foreign military advisors, training for
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(de facto state) troops abroad, and safe havens.176 Due to a strong patron, I posit that Taiwan’s
military capacity remains relatively equal to China, for now. Florea’s dataset codes Taiwan’s
military capacity as at parity with China.177 I make no claims about the longevity of this
relatively equal military capability. China’s rise means that the calculation and balance of power
may shift in the very near future. By “parity” I take into account Taiwan’s military capacity, plus
patron help. Taiwan’s own military capacity includes their own personnel, domestic weapons
systems, and defense expenditure. However, this does not mean that were a current military
conflict to break out, Taiwan and China would be equally matched. For one, this would hinge
significantly on how much military support the United States would give Taiwan in the event of
a “hot” conflict and not merely in the current “status quo, non-declaration of independence”
atmosphere.
The number of personnel can certainly tell us something about if a potential conflict were
to break out. How does Taiwan defend itself against the behemoth that is its parent state? Other
indicators include military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, total military expenditure, and
US military aid.

Military Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP
Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP shows how much is being spent on military
matters relative to a country’s gross domestic product. Starting in 1989, the data shows that
during the 1990s, Taiwan was spending a much higher percentage of its GDP (about twice as
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Florea, “De Facto States in International Politics (1945-2011): A New Data Set.” p. 17, 168.
Florea. p. 21, 168.
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much) than China when it came to military expenditures.178 This tells us that Taiwan was having
to expend more of its resources to ensure its safety. Between 1989-1999, Taiwan’s military
spending as a percentage of GDP ranged from 3.1 – 5.3 percent. Meanwhile, China’s ranged
from 1.7 - 2.5 percent of its GDP. During this decade, China’s highest military expenditure years
(1989, 1990, 1992) were still a smaller percentage of GDP than Taiwan’s lowest year (1999).

Figure 4.2: Military Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP in Taiwan and China
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Taiwan Military Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP
China Military Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP

There are two reasons this is rather unsurprising. One, as a much smaller island territory,
it makes sense that Taiwan is having to spend a higher percentage of its GDP towards defense.
They simply do not have the same monetary or personnel resources that China can pull from.
Secondly, as a (mostly) unrecognized state, Taiwan is not afforded the same “protections” that
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Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Military Expenditure by Country as Percentage of
Gross Domestic Product, 1988-2018,” 2018,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200902175812/https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data for all
countries from 1988–2018 as a share of GDP %28pdf%29.pdf.

108
other recognized states have, such as membership in the United Nations. Furthermore, its parent
state is part of the UN Security Council, making it unlikely that Taiwan is able to bring forward
complaints to the P5 without an automatic veto.

Total Military Expenditure
Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP cannot paint the full picture of military
expenditure. While it may be obvious that China is able to have a higher military expenditure
overall, it is still important to visualize the vast difference, which is available in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Total Military Expenditure in Taiwan and China
Year
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

Taiwan
$11.1 billion
$11.7 billion
$12.1 billion
$12.2 billion
$13.8 billion
$13.7 billion
$12.7 billion
$13.1 billion
$13 billion
$12.2 billion
$12.1 billion
$10.7 billion
$10.5 billion
$10.1 billion
$10 billion
$10.1 billion
$9.7 billion
$9.3 billion
$9.8 billion
$10 billion
$10.8 billion
$10.2 billion
$10.3 billion
$10.6 billion
$10 billion
$10 billion
$10.5 billion
$10.3 billion
$10.5 billion
$10.5 billion
$10.7 billion

China
$19.3 billion
$21.0 billion
$22.3 billion
$27.1 billion
$25.0 billion
$24.1 billion
$25.0 billion
$26.6 billion
$28.5 billion
$31.2 billion
$38.0 billion
$41.3 billion
$49.8 billion
$57.8 billion
$62.5 billion
$69.2 billion
$76.6 billion
$88.3 billion
$98.8 billion
$108.2 billion
$131.1 billion
$137.9 billion
$148.7 billion
$161.4 billion
$176.5 billion
$191.6 billion
$204.2 billion
$215.7 billion
$227.8 billion
$239.2 billion
$250 billion
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The above table shows how much China and Taiwan on spending, comparatively, on
military expenditure per year.179 The first-year data is reported, 1989, Chinese military spending
is about 8 billion US dollars more than Taiwan. Over the next two decades, China essentially
experiences exponential growth in military expenditure, while Taiwan remains relatively static.
By 2019, China is spending 25 times more than Taiwan. Keeping in mind that Taiwan and China
are spending a similar percentage of their GDP on military expenditure starting in the 2000s, it is
evident that China’s economic, and therefore military prowess, is exploding during this time
period.
The graph below shows when and by how much China outspends Taiwan on military
expenditure. The stark image makes it clear that while China has an exponential growth pattern,
the same cannot be said for Taiwan, who remains at the lowest rung of spending. This further
serves to show how China’s development and increasing standing economically is having dire
effects on Taiwan’s ability to protect itself against the parent state.
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Figure 4.3: Visualizing China’s Growing Military Expenditure (Billions of Dollars)
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With this in mind, how is it that Taiwan has been able to maintain the status quo at all?
While military spending may not have been much higher during the 1995-1996 missile crisis
between Taiwan and China, the reality is much different twenty years later. Why has China not
imposed its will on the wayward province?

Patron Support
Taiwan, like other de facto states, has a patron that provides crucial military support. This
support is vital in preventing the parent state (China) from reabsorbing the de facto state
(Taiwan). While what constitutes military support varies from case to case, it usually
encompasses weapons, training, and most importantly, a commitment to protect against the
parent state.
Part of Taiwan’s military expenditure comes from arms sales from the United States.
These arms sales encompass a variety of major items or services. These include weapons and
ammunitions, missiles, torpedoes, tanks, air defense systems, aircraft, helicopters, logistics, and
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support.180 These arms sales made up three-quarters of Taiwan’s imported arms, and the de facto
state ranked as the ninth largest recipient of arms worldwide.181 From 1990-2011, U.S. arms
sales to Taiwan totaled 44.79 billion US dollars.182 The table below breaks down the arms sales
amount by year.
Table 4.2: U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan: 1990-2011183
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

180

Arms Sales
$153 million
$372 million
$7.7 billion
$2.2 billion
$171 million
$267 million
$1 billion
$1.2 billion
$1.3 billion
$637 million
$1.9 billion
$1.1 billion
$1.5 billion
$775 million
$1.8 billion
$280 million
$0
$3.7 billion
$6.5 billion
$0
$6.4 billion
$5.9 billion

Shirley Kan, “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,” 2014, pp. 56 - 59,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200906182105/https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf.
181
Albert, “Unpacking the China-Taiwan Relationship”; Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database,” 2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200906182450/https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.
182
These figures are based on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as reported to the U.S. Congress. Kan, “Taiwan:
Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990.”, pp. 56-59.
183
Figures were calculated by adding each year’s arms sales as reported. Kan, pp. 56 - 59.
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U.S. arms sales to Taiwan were (and continue to be) significant, and military ties actually
deepened following China’s missile firings in 1995-1996.184 In addition to the material support
the United States sells to Taiwan, these arms sales represent a commitment by Taiwan’s patron
to defend them. Despite not recognizing Taiwan, U.S. support represents a more tangible and
important measure of support than recognition. Without U.S. arms sales and military support, it
is unlikely that Taiwan would be able to remain in the position they are now—as an
unrecognized state straddling the status quo against a major world power. Taiwan’s ability to
hold its own against China hinges nearly entirely on the support of the United States and gets to
the heart of de facto – parent state relationships. Moreover, as the strongest military in the world,
the United States proves a more than formidable ally against a rising China.
A de facto state militarily weaker than its parent state will be hard pressed to continue to
hold onto territory and self-rule. Usually, de facto states have a patron that can ensure and
supplement their military capability: Taiwan and the United States, Northern Cyprus and Turkey,
South Ossetia and Russia. In fact, it seems that not having a patron is the exception, with
Somaliland being an example of this.
Taiwan fulfills the “at parity” requirement just barely. This is why continuation of the
status quo is the most reasonable option and most of the population recognizes this. They do not
want to unify with China, but they are aware that a declaration of independence would likely
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Barton Gellman, “U.S. and China Nearly Came to Blows in ’96,” The Washington Post, June 21, 1998,
https://web.archive.org/save/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/06/21/us-and-chinanearly-came-to-blows-in-96/926d105f-1fd8-404c-9995-90984f86a613/; Chris Oxley, “Dangerous
Straits,” Frontline, 2001,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200916165125/https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/china/; J.
Michael Cole, “The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis: The Forgotten Showdown Between China and America,”
The National Interest, March 10, 2017,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200916165506/https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-third-taiwan-straitcrisis-the-forgotten-showdown-19742.
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inflame tensions, which could precipitate a conflict on the island, and possibly a Chinese
invasion. Taiwan’s security strategy currently rests on the promises made by the United States,
mostly on the back of the Taiwan Relations Act. But security experts warn that the military
balance between Taiwan and China is only set to widen, given China’s modernization plans,
specifically those of the People’s Liberation Army Navy.185 China’s goal here is to deter the
United States from being able to aid Taiwan, thereby cutting off Taiwan’s only mean of military
support. It remains to be seen how quickly China can modernize, and whether their desire make
Taiwan a part of the mainland will become a reality.

Economic and Administrative Capacity
The first indicator I will examine is total GDP. Gross domestic product is a way to
provide a landscape of the economy, notably its size and growth rate. In the case of Taiwan and
China, it will serve to show the difference between the two. As examined in the military capacity
section, China’s military spending overshadows Taiwan by a massive amount, which
corresponds to a higher GDP. Specifically, as China continues to grow economically, this
corresponds with a higher budget for military spending, while the percentage of military
spending remains relatively stable. This could have further consequences for Taiwan’s
precarious security. In short, total GDP is not only an economic capacity indicator, but also a
security concern and military capacity indicator.
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Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities-Background
and Issues for Congress,” 2020,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200916165825/https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33153/2
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The table below presents these total GDP figures.186 As expected, China has a much
larger GDP than Taiwan. While both Taiwan and China’s economies grow from 1980 to the
present day, there is no denying that China’s economy is growing at a much more rapid rate. As
a de facto state, Taiwan is already on shaky ground, being barred from participating fully on the
world stage. This is compounded by the parent state being a rising great power and economic
behemoth. A table is useful to compare the numbers side to side, as a chart would be unlikely to
accommodate the exponential difference between the two. Looking at the last year, 2018,
Taiwan’s GDP is just over $16 billion, while China’s is over $14 trillion.
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International Monetary Fund, “Report for Selected Countries and Subjects: Taiwan,” World Economic
Output Database, 2018,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200916170126/https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/01/weodat
a/weorept.aspx?sy=1980&ey=2023&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=528&s=NGDP_RPC
H%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC%2CPCPIPCH%2CLUR%2CGGXWDG_NGDP&grp=0&a=&pr.x=42&pr.y
=9; International Monetary Fund, “Report for Selected Countries and Subjects: China,” World Economic
Output Database, 2018,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200916170421/https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/01/weodat
a/weorept.aspx?pr.x=43&pr.y=7&sy=2016&ey=2023&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=92
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Table 4.3: GDP Comparison in Taiwan and China
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

Taiwan GDP China GDP
Year Taiwan GDP China GDP
$42.3 billion $305.3 billion 2016 $530.6 billion $11.2 trillion
$49 billion $290.8 billion 2017 $579.3 billion
$12 trillion
$49.5 billion $286.7 billion 2018 $613.3 billion $14.1 trillion
$54.2 billion $307.7 billion
$61.1 billion $316.6 billion
$63.6 billion $312.6 billion
$78.2 billion $303.3 billion
$105.0 billion $330.3 billion
$126.5 billion $411.9 billion
$152.7 billion $461.1 billion
$166.8 billion $398.6 billion
$187.4 billion $415.6 billion
$223.1 billion $495.7 billion
$235.2 billion $623.1 billion
$256.4 billion $566.5 billion
$279.3 billion $736.9 billion
$292.7 billion $867.2 billion
$303.7 billion $965.3 billion
$280.4 billion
$1 trillion
$304.2 billion
$1.1 trillion
$331.4 billion
$1.2 trillion
$300.4 billion
$1.3 trillion
$308.9 billion
$1.5 trillion
$318.6 billion
$1.7 trillion
$348.5 billion
$1.9 trillion
$375.8 billion
$2.3 trillion
$388.5 billion
$2.8 trillion
$408.2 billion
$3.6 trillion
$417.0 billion
$4.6 trillion
$392.1 billion
$5.1 trillion
$446.1 billion
$6.1 trillion
$485.7 billion
$7.6 trillion
$495.9 billion
$8.6 trillion
$511.6 billion
$9.6 trillion
$530.5 billion $10.5 trillion
$525.6 billion $11.2 trillion
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GDP per Capita
As one of the four “Asian tigers”, Taiwan has a very strong and developed economy, with a
GDP per capita of nearly $25,000 as of 2019.187 China’s is more than two times lower, sitting at
$10,098.188 To be fair, China’s economy has grown at a rapid rate for the last several decades,
but it is still currently categorized as an upper-middle income country, not yet being able to
break into a high-income categorization. Projections for 2024 have Taiwan’s GDP per capita to
be two times higher than China. Projections for Taiwan are $31,483.97 vs. $14,811.79 for
China.189 The figure below shows a chart visualizing the GDP per capita for Taiwan and China,
starting in 1980.
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Figure 4.4: GDP per Capita Comparison in Taiwan and China
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What does this mean for economic capacity? Simply put, Taiwan’s higher GDP per capita
represents a higher quality of life for residents of the island as a whole. Moreover, GDP per
capita takes population into account, whereas total GDP would look at the total economic output.
In terms of economic power projected on the world stage, China wins due to its massive GDP,
but in terms of citizen well-being, Taiwan comes out on top. China’s figures are brought down
by two factors: its massive 1.3 billion population, and the amount of people living in poverty,
somewhere around 43 million people as of 2018.190
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Eugene K. Chow, “China’s War on Poverty Could Hurt the Poor Most,” Foreign Policy, January 8,
2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20200916171032/https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/08/chinas-war-onpoverty-could-hurt-the-poor-most/.
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Tax Revenue as a Percentage of GDP
Another measure of economic capacity is the tax revenue as a percentage of GDP.
Figures for tax revenue as a percentage of GDP were taken from Taiwan and China’s
government statistics sites respectively. I also consulted World Bank figures for China, which
aggregates estimates from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.191 Interestingly, the figures reported
by China differ substantially from those reported by the World Bank, IMF, and OECD. Tax
revenue as a percentage of GDP is revenue that is collected on taxes: income, profits, social
security, goods and services, payroll, property, and other taxes.192 Additionally, it is regarded as
a measure of the degree of government control over the state’s economy and the economy’s
resources. The figures for tax revenue as a percentage of GDP reported by China are much
higher (percentagewise) than those given by international organizations. Does China have an
incentive to show that they have greater control over the economy than might otherwise suggest?
Would a higher percentage of tax revenue signal better government control and economic state
capacity? A state with revenue at a higher percentage of GDP than its counterpart would
conceivably have greater ability to reach its population, and better administrative control.
Although Taiwan is a highly advanced economy, statistical figures on their tax revenue
as a percentage of GDP do not appear in the World Bank or International Monetary Fund
websites. This is due in large part to their parent state’s campaign to roll back recognition of
Taiwan in any form. One of the ways this is done is to deny Taiwan membership,
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World Bank, “Tax Revenue: China,” World Bank, 2016,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200916171311/https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.Z
S?locations=CN.
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OECD, Tax Revenue Indicators, OECD Data (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2016),
https://doi.org/10.1787/d98b8cf5-en.
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acknowledgement, or recognition in international organizations. Therefore, I am unable to verify
Taiwan’s figures against those reported by international organizations. Nevertheless, Taiwan
reports a higher tax revenue as a percentage of GDP than China. From 2001-2018, Taiwan’s tax
revenue as a percentage of GDP were between 11.71 - 13.95 percentage points.193 China’s World
Bank figures report that between 2005-2016, their tax revenue percentage was between 8.57 10.31 percentage points.194 China’s self-reported figures range from 13.8 – 21.3 percentage
points, nearly double the World Bank figures.195
What can be learned from these numbers? For starters, this can be used a measure of not
only economic capacity, but also administrative capacity in both territories. Taiwan can be said
to have objectively better revenue collection measures, and able to reach a higher proportion of
its population. Also, it has a higher level of control over its economic resources as compared to
China. This disparity in revenue collection and administrative capacity is one reason why China
would be compelled to misrepresent their tax revenue collection.
The table below shows the figures for tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. The “Taiwan”
column shows figures reported by Taiwan in terms of percentages. The next two columns are
labeled “China (World Bank)” and “China (Self-Reported)”. The World Bank column are figures
reported by several international organizations, while the self-reported figures were taken from
China’s statistics. The disparities in the figures are interesting and point to how the Chinese
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Statistics, Republic of China (Taiwan), 2019,
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government wishes to be perceived internationally. A higher tax revenue as a percentage of GDP
would signal more capacity, and the ability to collect revenue from a higher proportion of its
population.

Table 4.4: Tax Revenue as Percentage of GDP in Taiwan and China
Year Taiwan China (World Bank) China (Self-Reported)
2001
12.67
13.80
2002
11.77
14.10
2003
11.71
15.10
2004
12.21
16.10
2005
13.35
8.57
16.70
2006
13.07
9.06
17.40
2007
13.43
9.77
18.60
2008
13.95
10.10
18.40
2009
12.26
10.31
18.50
2010
11.97
10.21
19.30
2011
12.33
10.31
20.20
2012
12.23
10.26
21.30
2013
12.04
9.91
21.10
2014
12.26
9.71
20.40
2015
12.73
9.42
20.10
2016
12.67
9.20
18.90
2017
12.52
18.80
2018
13.01
18.90

State Building and Institutions
Taiwan is coded as a de facto state starting in 1971. Unlike Northern Cyprus, it has
enjoyed a very high degree of state building since its inception. This can be directly traced back
to the high level of international support it received from countries such as the United States.
Even after the Kuomintang (KMT) lost control of mainland China to the Chinese Communist
Party and was exiled to the island of Taiwan, it was regarded as the legitimate government of
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China for several years---until the loss of its UN seat in 1971. While Taiwan’s role to de facto
statehood is distinct from other cases in some ways, it presents a noteworthy piece of the
recognition and sovereignty puzzle.
Because Taiwan is distinct in that it had international recognition, and then lost it, it
unsurprisingly had all state institutions in place following 1971.196 For most de facto states, there
is variation in how they build and establish state institutions, but Taiwan only lost recognition,
not its ability to function as a state. Even after the loss of the UN seat, Taiwan was able to
maintain external relations, and was not relegated to pariah status like other de facto states or
independence/separatist movements.197 It is still recognized by a handful of states, although
China has been successful in convincing some states who formerly recognized Taiwan (such as
the Solomon Islands and Kiribati) to switch allegiances.198 As of 2020, fifteen countries
recognize Taiwan: Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu, Eswatini, Vatican City, Belize,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines.199 While recognition among the international community is up in
the air, Taiwan’s administrative capacity boasts high quality institutions. Compared to China,
administrative capacity is higher, thanks to the economic growth of the past few decades.
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Taiwan is coded as having a very high degree of state building, which means that the de
facto state has the most characteristics of a state, including foreign relationships, representative
offices abroad (de facto embassies in the cases of Taiwan and Northern Cyprus) and international
commercial partners.200 Taiwan perhaps embodies the exception to the rule when it comes to de
facto states and external relations with other states. Where Northern Cyprus can only rely on
Turkey for trade and recognition, Taiwan boasts a high level of trade with countries all over the
world. Where South Ossetia and Transnistria rely heavily on Russia for economic support,
Taiwan is actually a foreign aid donor. Where various de facto states may manage a handful of
representative offices abroad, Taiwan boasts fifteen embassies (corresponding to the fifteen
countries extending Taiwan recognition), as well as two consulates and eighty-nine
representative or trade offices all over the globe.201 It also holds membership or observer status
in over fifty international governmental organizations (IGOs), among them the World Trade
Organization (as Chinese Taipei), the Asian Development Bank, and the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).202

Income Classification
The income classification of Taiwan and China is another indicator of the economic
capacity of both territories. Like GDP per capita, Taiwan comes out ahead, but it also does not
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make up for China’s ability to wield its massive economic might compared to Taiwan. Rather,
this indicator serves to present another piece of the picture. The income classification of a
country is calculated with GNI per capita. There are four total income classifications: low
income, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high income. The table below shows the income
classification for Taiwan and China from the years 1987 (first available year) to 2018.203 Taiwan
easily falls into the high-income category each year, reflecting their status as an advanced
economy. China’s classification is more varied throughout the three decades. They move from a
low-income country, to lower-middle, to then upper-middle by 2010.
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Table 4.5: Income Classification by Year in Taiwan and China
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

Taiwan
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income
High Income

China
Low Income
Low Income
Low Income
Low Income
Low Income
Low Income
Low Income
Low Income
Low Income
Low Income
Lower-Middle Income
Low Income
Lower-Middle Income
Lower-Middle Income
Lower-Middle Income
Lower-Middle Income
Lower-Middle Income
Lower-Middle Income
Lower-Middle Income
Lower-Middle Income
Lower-Middle Income
Lower-Middle Income
Lower-Middle Income
Upper-Middle Income
Upper-Middle Income
Upper-Middle Income
Upper-Middle Income
Upper-Middle Income
Upper-Middle Income
Upper-Middle Income
Upper-Middle Income
Upper-Middle Income
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Exactly what GNI per capita makes a country high or low income? The number varies
slightly per year. In 1987 for example, a low-income country like China would have to have a
GNI per capital of under $480. A high-income country, like Taiwan, would have to have a GNI
per capita of over $6,000. By 1999, when China is solidly lower-middle income, the GNI per
capita income criteria for these countries is between $756 and $2,995. The criteria for high
income countries in 1999 is those with over $9,265. In 2018, the most recent year, China, as an
upper-middle income country, would fall between $3,996-12,375. Taiwan, as a high-income
country, has a GNI per capita of over $12,375.
There are two reasons why income classification is another useful indicator to have for
economic capacity. For one, simply by virtue of Taiwan being present in these income
classifications means that a proper comparison can be made between the two economies, and that
these figures come from the same credible source. Second, it provides another example of the
dynamic and relationship between mainland China and Taiwan. Taiwan provides a shining
example of economic success despite nonrecognition or partial recognition. A booming
economy, and one of the four “Asian Tigers”, Taiwan comes out ahead in economic and quality
of life indicators. It has robust trade with neighbors, and its citizens are richer than those on the
mainland. The economic success of Taiwan shows that unrecognized, or in Taiwan’s case,
partially recognized states, have a place in the world economy and can thrive. However, this
economic success cannot eclipse the major security concerns that arise from a Chinese great
power. Taiwan still walks the tightrope of its citizens and at least one major political party
completely shunning unification with the mainland, while knowing that a declaration of
independence would most likely ignite a crisis. This means that while Taiwan can arguably
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“come out ahead” in economic and administrative capacity indicators, it is not enough to
overcome the status quo strategy it currently pursues.

Conclusions and Policy Implications for Taiwan
This chapter presents an overview of the case of Taiwan, and the conditions under which
they pursue a sovereignty strategy. “They” mean the Taiwanese people, and the political leaders,
mainly those of the two major parties, the KMT and the DPP, first and foremost reject the idea of
unification with the mainland. China’s compromise, a “One Country, Two Systems” idea
modeled after Hong Kong is wildly unpopular, and recent events in Hong Kong have solidified
this. A “One Country, Two Systems” model would allow the island of Taiwan to keep their form
of democratic governance for a specified amount of time, but most importantly, it would require
Taiwan to be formally absorbed into the People’s Republic of China, bringing their run as a de
facto state to an end.
Since unification is so despised, why not advocate for independence? After all, Taiwan’s
economy and population would make it more than a viable state, and it has survived decades as a
de facto state already. However, a universal declaration of independence is generally considered
to be a bad idea for the simple reason that it would most likely trigger a crisis with China. A
military invasion would then draw the United States, Taiwan’s patron, into the conflict. This
would mean a possible military showdown between the two top military powers, not to mention
the physical and economic destruction of Taiwan.
To avoid this scenario, Taiwan must walk a thin line that advocates for the continuation
of the status quo, protects Taiwanese democracy, and assures others that a unilateral declaration
of independence is not in the cards. When measured against China, Taiwan’s material
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capabilities and state capacity further illustrate why the status quo is the only possible option for
Taiwan.
Militarily, China outspends Taiwan, and has more personnel. The manpower alone would
be difficult to overcome in a conflict. Taiwan relies on the United States commitment in order to
close the military gap with China, although it is unlikely how stable the military situation will
remain. Economically and administratively, Taiwan outshines China in quality-of-life indicators,
but China’s massive economy means that they have an edge when it comes to spending.
Furthermore, they use economic promises to push a derecognition campaign against Taiwan,
which has lost the recognition of several states over just the past five years.
Taiwan currently pursues a policy of status quo, which aims to keep the current
conditions of de facto statehood as long as possible. However, increasing tensions with China as
well as a presidential election in 2020 means that Taiwan is always a potential global hotspot.
For instance, even though the United States has given Taiwan aid, whether economically or
militarily, they have stopped short of recognition with the island. To say this would be politically
risky is an understatement. China, who considers Taiwan to be a wayward province, has
repeatedly expressed anger over Taiwan.204 Under the Trump administration, the United States
has said that the relationship with Taiwan is stronger than ever.205 Whether the U.S. would stand
with Taiwan in an attack from China remains to be seen. With concerns over a rising China, and
whether this rise will be peaceful or aggressive, Taiwan is surely part of the calculation that
policymakers and leaders need to take into account.
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Chapter 5: Somaliland and the Quest for Independence
This chapter focuses on the de facto state of Somaliland. Directed under British rule
during the colonial era, it differed from Somalia, which was under Italian jurisdiction. After
being granted independence from the British in 1960, Somaliland got a taste of independence
before ultimately unifying with Somalia and creating the Somali Republic.
The de facto state was born as a result of civil war. After 1991, Somaliland embarked on a
state building project that has turned into an unlikely success. I will show that Somaliland has a
higher state capacity compared to Somaliland outright. Militarily, there are more military
personnel at their disposal and spend more on security compared to Somalia. Economically,
remittances have helped boost the economy during the rebuilding phase. The GDP per capita is
higher, and tax revenues, while low, are still higher than Somalia by more than double the
percentage points. Administratively, Somaliland has demonstrated the presence of all institutions
necessary for “statehood”, including a functioning legislative and judicial system, as well as
education and media. The past few years have also seen Somaliland make inroads in forging
relationships with other countries.

Somaliland Theory of Recognition
The case of Somaliland provides a theory in which the de facto state vies for
independence. Somaliland, a de facto state since 1991, has sought independence from its parent
state, Somalia. Following a brutal civil war waged by the Barre regime of Somalia, Somaliland
declared independence on May 18, 1991. The state building process was undertaken by the
majority ruling Isaaq clan of the region, and they claimed that this was not an act of secession,
but rather a return to lost statehood. The region of Somaliland had been a separate territory
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before 1960, obtained some measure of recognition (exactly five days of independency) in June
1960, and therefore the 1991 declaration was something distinct from secession.206
Chief among the other reasons they assert their right to recognized statehood lies in their
overall better state capacity. Militarily, they have proved better partners in the fight against AlShabaab, protection from pirates off the Somali coast, and are general considered a zone of
stability in the hotspot that is East Africa. Economically and administratively, Somaliland has
shown that a lack of international aid and no patron has not impeded their ability to conduct state
building following conflict.
Somalia as a parent state is weak, compared to other de facto-parent state pairings. The
Fragile States Index, which measures corruption, government effectiveness, illicit economy, and
level of democracy, among other indicators, has listed Somalia as the most fragile state seven out
of fifteen times, and the second most fragile state six out of fifteen times, most recently in
2020.207 Transparency International, which tracks corruption, has listed Somalia as the most
corrupt country twelve years running.208 Somaliland does not appear in these indices, therefore a
direct comparison cannot be made, but there is strong evidence showing that Somaliland would
definitely fare better than its parent state.
Despite its lack of empirical statehood and poor governance, Somalia has been able to
use its status as a recognized state to veto attempts to recognize Somaliland. Other examples of
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successful transitions from unrecognized to recognized states in Africa, Eritrea and South Sudan,
both show that the home state acquiescence is necessary to obtain independence.209 The African
Union likewise has been unwilling to support Somaliland independence, due to Somalia’s
reticence.
The table below presents a figure demonstrating the core theory for this case study. As
previously noted, Somaliland became a de facto state in 1991, following a particularly brutal
civil war. The desire to separate from Somalia post conflict was not a uniquely secessionist one,
but rather, is argued to be one of a failed union. The British ruled Somaliland became part of a
federation with the Italian ruled Somalia—following thirty years of this, it broke down. This
could be construed as simply a return to the previous situation, not a case of secession. After all,
Somaliland has now been a de facto state for twenty-nine years, nearly the same amount of time
it was part of the federation.
After the 1991 separation, Somaliland set on a state building exercise. Somaliland
primarily emphasized security spending. This makes sense for two reasons. First, as a de facto
state, survival is an ever-present concern. In this case, the parent state does not pose much of a
threat, as Somalia was dealing with its own post conflict state collapse. Nevertheless, survival
was still a concern as a new state, as the threat of internal conflict is always a possibility. Second,
Somaliland prioritized security due to the triple threats of Al-Shabaab, piracy on the coast, and
border conflicts with the Puntland region. As with the previous case studies, the military capacity
of the de facto state needs to be equal or higher than the parent state for the de facto state to exist
and survive. This is likewise the case with Somaliland, where the military capacity is higher than
Somalia.
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Economically and administratively, Somaliland struggled with building the new state in
some ways. The lack of foreign aid meant that Somaliland had to rely solely on local and
domestic revenue, which limited growth, especially since so much of the budget had to be spent
on security. However, the lack of foreign aid provided flexibility and creativity in state building.
For Somaliland, this meant a hybrid democratic system that consists of both clan and
parliamentary rule. Somaliland also had to find international partners in the region to trade with,
all against the backdrop of nonrecognition and no formal patron support. Despite these setbacks,
Somaliland still rates higher than Somalia in economic and administrative capacity. While
Somalia denies Somaliland recognition on the international stage, they have no real mechanisms
by which to threaten to reunite Somaliland by force (unlike say, Taiwan and China).
Therefore, this leads to a preference for independence by Somaliland. Clearly, they
believe they have proven their case for recognition. Somaliland says they are looking to return to
a previous arrangement, but they have also proven that they are functionally and practically
capable of running a separate state. The unrecognized state gradually built state institutions over
the years and the de facto state experiment of the last twenty-nine years has been quite
successful, especially considering that Somaliland, unlike other de facto states, does not have a
patron. Neither do they benefit from substantial foreign aid. Their preference for independence is
also evident in the outward signs: a separate currency, a flag, and system of government.
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Figure 5.1: Somaliland Model for Independence
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Alternative Explanations for Somaliland’s Preference Towards Independence
In this section, I will touch upon two factors that play an important part in Somaliland’s
preference towards independence. The first is the role that identity plays in Somaliland’s push
towards independence and recognition. Once again, identity-based arguments are not to be
thought of as separate from the structural, state capacity-based argument in this dissertation, but
as a complement and providing the necessary framework that explains the conditions that leads
to current de facto statehood. The second factor concerns the wider international community’s
reticence to recognize Somaliland as an independent state. Would this not have a dampening
effect on their independence efforts? One might think so, but we see the opposite happening,
with Somaliland as eager as ever to recruit states to their side. Overall, these other explanations
are not false when describing Somaliland, but they are incomplete.
Somalilanders conceive of their identity as a distinct entity from Somalia’s in a variety of
ways. For one, Somalilanders point to their history as a British-ruled colonial subject, rather than
an Italian-ruled one, as one distinction from Somalia. Second, they point to the just theory of
secession, and gross human rights committed under the Barre regime, as a reason they deserve an
independent state, and most importantly, why they are not Somalian. While colonial legacy is a
legitimate claim under international law, the just theory of secession is not.211 Given this
reasoning, why would this not be enough to explain their preference towards independence?
These are certainly compelling reasons for Somaliland to push for their independence. However,
I argue that there is an element missing in these explanations, which rely on “the outside”, and
do not give enough credit to Somaliland’s successful state building efforts. While Somaliland is
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poor, it is relatively richer than its parent state. And while much can leave to be desired for
health, education, and general welfare, the government of Somaliland has been able to provide
security to its citizens, arguably the first and most important job of a state. What identity-based
arguments leave out is Somaliland’s track record as a functioning state in all but name. The
identity-based arguments provide the framework, but the work on improving state capacity
provides the longevity of the de facto state, and therefore the push for independence.
On a wider scale, Somaliland puts forth convincing historical and legal arguments to
justify why recognition should be given, but still remains unrecognized nearly thirty years after
declaring independence in 1991. In this respect, the question becomes not “Why is Somaliland
still unrecognized?” but rather “Why does Somaliland continue to pursue independence in the
face of no recognition (and no patron)?”. Why Somaliland is not recognized comes down to the
taboo against secession and the wider community not wanting to endorse it, and major players’
lack of strategic interest in Somaliland. Ultimately, recognition of de facto states is an uphill
battle, and is unlikely in the current international system.212 As Caspersen notes, “The dominant
strategy when it comes to unrecognised states is to ignore them”.213 Recognition itself does not
depend on the many positives that Somaliland puts forth and which I explore: neither military
superiority, economic viability, successful state building, or even democracy will guarantee that
Somaliland becomes recognized. Western countries have indicated that recognition for
Somaliland first needs to proceed from the African Union, which itself has been reticent to
consider Somaliland as a recognized state. Ethiopia, as the headquarters of the AU, is not willing
to push the issue that could divide members. Moreover, Ethiopia is perceived as being in favor of
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the current status quo. Other countries, like Djibouti, also favor the status quo, as they would
have to compete for military bases and trade flows into Hargeisa were it to be recognized.214
Paradoxically, scholars note that Somaliland’s lack of recognition could have facilitated
its growth and development, by allowing it to rule under its clan-based, pastoral democracy,
without interference.215 A lack of aid removed the need for conflict among the clans, while
others note that the lack of foreign aid made the government more accountable, democratic, and
open to compromise.216 As I expand later on, Somaliland’s higher relative state capacity over
Somalia makes it so that Somaliland continues to pursue independence. There is no incentive for
Somaliland to agree to reunification with a failed state. Moreover, while it will not guarantee
recognition, Somaliland can point to its better military, economy, and institutions to differentiate
itself from Somalia. Even with an international community refusing to consider recognition,
Somaliland’s preference will likely remain the same, as long as it holds relative strength over its
parent state. The next sections will continue to expand these arguments. While identity and the
politics of recognition undoubtedly play a role in Somaliland’s preferences, they cannot
satisfactorily explain the contradictions. The arguments put forth in this chapter adequately fill
the gaps that remain.
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Somaliland Military Capacity Overview
Due to Somalia being commonly characterized as a “failed state”, it is easy to see how
Somaliland surpasses the parent state when it comes to military capability. Somaliland’s military
power, while lacking a patron, is still much stronger than Somalia’s.217 What exactly does much
stronger mean? In this instance, the indicator in question, relative rebel capacity, comes from
Florea’s dataset of de facto state. Florea codes relative rebel capacity on a 1-4 scale. 1
corresponds to a de facto state being weaker than the parent state. 2 corresponds with parity, an
example seen in the case of the Taiwan-China dynamic. 3 corresponds to stronger than the
parent state. Finally, a 4 on this measure is the highest categorization, which Somaliland
exemplifies.218
In terms of military personnel available, Somaliland has roughly 5,000-8,000 soldiers at
its disposal.219 A reliable figure on Somalia’s military personnel is harder to come by, with one
academic source citing 100-2,000 ready personnel (Florea), to another military source giving a
figure of “possibly fewer than 10,000.220
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Table 5.1: Military Personnel Estimates in Somaliland and Somalia
Area

Low Estimate Military Personnel High Estimate Military Personnel

Somaliland 5,000

8,000

Somalia

10,000

2,000

The Somali army itself is not even in charge of security for the region. That task belongs
to the United Nations Security Council, and their deployment of the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) and the United Nations Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS).221 In place
since 2007, AMISOM is responsible for protection against militant group Al-Shabaab, and has
grown to an estimated 22,000 troops from various African Union countries, such as Uganda,
Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Sierra Leone.222 The Somali National Army (SNA) is
too weak to provide protection, and were AMISOM to leave, the area would undoubtedly fall
into a much worse security situation. As it stands, reports indicate that up to thirty percent of
soldiers in the SNA are unarmed, including areas where Al-Shabaab has overpowered the
military.223 An agreement made in April 2017 established a security pact that promised further
support from the international community, but none of the milestones are within reach.224 Due to
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the lack of coordination between donors, extreme corruption, and lack of institution building, the
SNA is an army in name only.225
As it is, AMISOM has not been able to deter Al-Shabaab from the region, or completely
flush them out. In 2009, the group seized control of both Mogadishu and Kismayo (a port city)
and began taxing imports at the port.226 The accumulation of revenues from the port contributed
to the group’s ability to fund further attacks, further lending credence to the necessity of
economic capacity (revenue) in order to fund military capacity (security). The militant group was
driven out of the port city in October 2012, but still remains part of the social fabric of the
capital, Mogadishu.227 While Al-Shabaab itself has not been successful in holding Somali
territory for a long enough period of time to conduct adequate state building, it prevented
Somalia from using its own territory.

Military Expenditure as a Percentage of the Government Budget
Military expenditure (as a percentage) for Somaliland is high, even for a de facto state.
Somaliland, like other de facto states, needs a high enough military capacity to protect against
the parent state, but in the case of Somaliland, it also needs enough military power to protect
against Al-Shabaab, piracy, and a border dispute with Puntland. While Al-Shabaab has not
inflicted the same level of damage in Somaliland that it has in Somalia, it still requires military
capacity to deal with it. For piracy, Somaliland monitors this on its northern coast with a coast
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guard of about 600 personnel.228 The case of Puntland is a self-declared, semi-autonomous
region in northern Somalia and east of Somaliland, although it does not rise to the level of de
facto statehood by most scholars (the exception here is Florea, who does code Puntland as a de
facto state in his dataset).
Figures for security spending in Somaliland are usually given in Somaliland Shilling
(SLS, not to be confused for the Somali Shilling, SOS) numbers, especially if the source is the
government of Somaliland. The World Bank will sometimes have figures for Somaliland, but
only as a comparison to Somalia, and not usually as stand-alone reports. Since the Somaliland
Shilling is an “unrecognized” currency, it has no official exchange rate.229 Therefore, it is
difficult to ascertain military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and instead military
expenditure as a percentage of the budget is used, since that is more readily available. I use
“security spending” interchangeably with “military expenditure”, as they both represent military
capacity in both Somaliland and Somalia. More than any other de facto-parent state dynamic,
military capacity encompasses not only protection from external threats, but also internal
security, which presents different challenges and struggles for both.
Between 2002-2011, Somaliland spent an average of 51.1 percent of the government
budget on security services.230 In 2011, this figure reached 42.2 million US Dollars, which
represented between 50-55.2 percent of the government’s total budget.231 In contrast, for 2011,
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Somaliland spent only 5.9 million US Dollars on education, and 2.7 million US Dollars on
health.232 For 2012-2014, the military / security spending as a percentage of the budget decreased
to an average of 41.5 percent, but still remained the largest category in the government budget.233
The next highest category, Administration and General Services, took up about 29 percent of the
budget.234Military spending figures for 2015 decreased to 35.7 percent of the government
budget, indicating that while security spending remained a huge chunk of the budget, it was
getting nearer to one-third, rather than one-half of the budget.235 Security spending was similar
for 2018-2020, with spending compromising between 26-35 percent of the budget.236 The table
below presents security spending as a percentage of the budget, by year. Note that figures for
2016 and 2017 are not available, although it can be reasonably surmised that security spending
was likely about one-third of the budget.
Somalia figures for military expenditure as a percentage of GDP are likewise absent,
although it is possible to glean security spending as a percentage of the annual budget, as done
with Somaliland. The international community, acting as donors and with international
organizations, contribute to the existence of the Somali National Army, but the figures for
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security spending take into account the Somali federal government budget for the year, and not
necessarily all the international aid given. As it stands, Somalia spends more on security (as a
percentage of its budget) than any other fragile state, with the exception of Afghanistan.237 In
2014, Somalia spent 45 percent of its budget on security, which is even higher than Somaliland
for that year.238 2015 and 2016 saw 36.1 and 35.1 percent security spending respectfully,
representing a substantial drop from 2014.239 In 2017, Somalia spent 33.9 percent of its budget
on security spending, and in 2020, the figure was projected to be 37.6 percent.240 The security
percentages are similar for Somaliland and Somalia, looking at after 2014. This indicates that 1)
lack of recognition means that Somaliland needs to spend a large amount of its budget on
security, and 2) recognition does not relieve Somalia of having to spend a similarly large
percentage of their budget. Somaliland, like Somalia, have the triple threat of Al-Shabaab,
piracy, and border disputes. Somalia, despite receiving international aid from a variety of
partners, does have to spend a similar amount of its budget as its unrecognized counterpart.
While the threats are similar, there is no denying that Somalia currently faces a much larger AlShabaab threat than Somaliland, which would explain the need for high spending.
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Table 5.2: Security Spending as a Percentage of Budget in Somaliland and Somalia241
Year
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020

Somaliland Security Spending Somalia Security Spending
51.1%
51.1%
51.1%
51.1%
51.1%
51.1%
51.1%
51.1%
51.1%
55.2%
40.5%
43.0%
41.0%
45.0%
35.7%
36.1%
35.1%
33.9%
33.0%
26.7%
34.7%
37.6%

The total amounts spent on military expenditure are difficult to ascertain for Somaliland.
Nevertheless, it is useful to compare what is available, if only to give an approximation. We
know that in 2011, Somaliland spent between 50-55.2 percent of its budget on military spending,
and that this figure was 42.2 million US Dollars. This means that the total budget for the year
was approximately 84.4 million US Dollars. By 2018- 2019, security spending as a percentage of
the budget was significantly lower, 33 and 26.7 percent respectfully. The budget is also
significantly larger from 2011. For 2018 and 2019, the total government budget was 322 and 350
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million US Dollars.242 This means that military expenditure for 2018 was about 106 million US
Dollars and 2019 was about 94.5 million dollars.
The military expenditure figures for Somalia come from the World Bank and the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and show that Somalia is spending less, as a
total amount, than Somaliland. 2018 is the only year where data is available for both, and for the
sake of comparison, the year that will be examined further. Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute notes that in 2018, Somalia spends 62 million US Dollars on military
expenditures.243 The same year, Somaliland spent 106 million US Dollars on military
expenditures. Somaliland spending more is due to its continued self-reliance and lack of
recognition from other states. Even though there are instances of other countries partnering with
Somaliland for military training or exercises, these are few and far between, and only happening
in recent years.244 Lack of recognition and international aid means that Somaliland needs to
ensure that it spends enough on security.
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Table 5.3: Military Expenditure in Somaliland and Somalia
Year
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

Somaliland Military Expenditure
$42.2 million

$106 million
$94.5 million

Somalia Military Expenditure

$26 million
$60 million
$47 million
$48 million
$60 million
$62 million

Somaliland Economic Capacity and Administrative Capacity Overview
Partly due to its status as an unrecognized state, economic data on Somaliland are
difficult to procure and often do not appear in international economic measurements. However,
Somaliland has been able to build its economic capacity since its de facto independence, and all
without significant economic aid that its parent state, Somalia, was able to procure. The
economic recovery since the civil war has been boosted by the Somaliland diaspora abroad, as
well as investments from the Middle East and other countries in the Horn of Africa.245
Remittances from the diaspora abroad come in the form of either financial investments or
small money towards families and individuals—thirty percent of remittances ($234 million) are
the financial and capital investments, and the remaining seventy percent ($546 million) are the so
called “small money”. As of 2014, remittances constituted a whopping 54 percent of the
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country’s GDP. 246 The remittances have been vital in reconstructing the post-conflict
Somaliland society after de facto independence in 1991. Notably, the cash transfers to families
and individuals have been crucial for livelihood maintenance and food security, as well as
driving the economy, with about 44 percent of all households receiving a monthly maintenance
from relatives abroad247. Additionally, it plays a role in economic stability, as people can rely on
this money on a regular basis.

GDP Comparison: Somaliland vs. Somalia
The first economic indicator is a GDP comparison between Somaliland and Somalia.
Both GDP figures start between 2012 and 2013, and Somalia’s is higher than Somaliland’s by
about two billion US dollars. Over time, the figures show that Somaliland’s economy has grown,
from 1.59 billion US Dollars in 2012, to 2.57 billion US Dollars in 2018. Between 2012 and
2017, Somaliland’s GDP increased 10.6 percent.248 The tables below show the GDP amounts for
Somaliland and Somalia, in billions of US Dollars.
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Table 5.4: GDP in Somaliland and Somalia
Year
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

Somaliland GDP
$1.59 billion
$1.83 billion
$2.01 billion
$2.20 billion
$2.32 billion
$2.57 billion

Somalia GDP
$3.89 billion
$3.96 billion
$4.05 billion
$4.20 billion
$4.51 billion
$4.72 billion

GDP per Capita
The next indicator is GDP per capita, which is a more accurate measure of quality of life.
As the tables and figure in the next pages indicate, Somaliland has an edge over Somalia in GDP
per capita. Somaliland’s lowest GDP per capita figure ($478) is still higher than Somalia’s
highest ($315). Additionally, Somaliland’s GDP per capita growth is also bigger than Somalia’s.
Somaliland’s GDP per capita went up $198 in five years, Somalia’s only increased by $17 in the
same time frame.
These data, like GDP, are available starting in 2012 and 2013. While it is an incomplete
picture of the two economies, it can still provide useful and relevant information in regard to the
comparison between Somaliland and Somalia. Civil war and state fragility meant that verified
economic figures for both are difficult to come by in the 1990s and 2000s.
While Somaliland’s GDP per capita is higher than Somalia’s, it is worth noting that the
GDP per capita is still quite low, and that both territories easily fall into the low-income
category. Still, the purpose of this study is a parent – de facto state comparison, but it is worth
noting that of the three case studies, Somaliland’s economy is by far the poorest.
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Table 5.5: GDP per Capita in Somaliland and Somalia249
Year Somaliland GDP per capita Somalia GDP per Capita
2012
$478
$298
2013
$537
$295
2014
$573
$293
2015
$610
$296
2016
$626
$309
2017
$675
$315
2018

Figure 5.3: GDP per Capita Comparison in Somaliland and Somalia
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Tax Revenue as a Percentage of GDP
In previous case studies (Northern Cyprus and Taiwan), tax revenue as a percentage of
GDP is used as one indicator of economic capacity. A state with adequate tax collection systems
is able to fund public goods for its citizens. It is understood that states with adequate tax revenue
collection also have sufficient enforcement mechanisms. Somaliland is a somewhat different
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type of de facto state. In this final case study (Somaliland), tax revenue figures are not as
available or reliable. The de facto state is in the process of shifting from an informal economic
system, to one that is more formal, coherent, and recorded. It is in the process of building the
state, and the tax systems that come with it. A mainly pastoral territory, Somaliland relies largely
on livestock, which makes up 30 percent of its economy. Coupled with being in the low-income
category, tax revenues are not going to be a main source of the economy.
Two sources put Somaliland’s tax revenue as a percentage of GDP at a mere 7 percent,
which is far below the twenty percent that the United Nations considers adequate for growth.250
Currently, tax collection is hampered by outdated tax laws, and poor compliance by taxpayers.
Somalia has even lower figures, with revenue coming in between 2.1, 2.5, and 3.5 percent of
GDP for the years 2015, 2016, and 2017, respectfully.251 Projected figures for 2018 - 2020 did
not break 4.5 percent.
Tax collectors in Somaliland, particularly in the capital city and hub, Hargeisa, collect direct
income taxes from citizens. This method does not necessarily result in either high levels of
honesty or compliance from residents, but there are some signs that revenues from taxes are
increasing, as citizens’ trust in the government and desire for basic goods increases.252 In
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Hargeisa, revenue increased 80 percent from 2010 – 2015, although this hides the low level of
revenue in absolute numbers, which was merely 9.5 million US Dollars for 2016.253
Importantly, the state’s transition from a mostly informal to a more formal economy has not
resulted in significant enforcement from Somaliland. While the use of an enforcement
mechanism in order to raise revenue is vital for state capacity, it is unlikely that this would result
in higher tax revenue in such a poor region. Also, while tax revenue figures are low, Somaliland
relies heavily on them, because the lack of foreign aid means that the de facto state needed to
ensure its own survival. It is in the interest of Somaliland to make sure to collect revenue from
taxation, while at the same time does not cause a backlash by repressing citizens for collections.
Rather, the lack of foreign aid and reliance on revenues means that Somaliland has been more,
not less, accountable to citizens, in order to make sure they trust the government and in turn are
more likely to pay taxes.254

Somaliland State Building
Unlike Northern Cyprus and Taiwan, Somaliland’s administrative capacity was not as
well-developed for the first years of its existence. Due to the destruction on the capital city,
Hargeisa, during the civil war, Somaliland had to contend with post-conflict reconstruction, as
well as state building, and setting up new institutions. Nevertheless, Somaliland was able to
establish government structures and improve their quality (before the collapse of the parent
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state).255 All the while, Somalia, the parent state, struggles to get past the first stage of state
building, establishing long-term control over territory.
Somaliland has shown significant growth in its state building apparatus since 1991. For
the first two years, state building was coded as “low”, which essentially means that Somaliland is
only able to control territory and provide minimal public security during these first crucial years.
From 1993-2000, Somaliland entered a period of “moderate” state building, which meant that in
addition to having a monopoly on violence, the (de facto) state at this point allocates some
resources for governance. In the case of Somaliland, this included printing money, policing local
communities, and organizing multiparty elections.256 At this point, it became evident that
Somaliland’s stability in the face of nonrecognition and lack of support were not going to be
impediments to the development of this relatively new de facto state. Somaliland, a “selfgoverning” nation in all senses, used traditional forms of governance that entered consultation
and consent.257
From 2001- 2011, Somaliland was considered to have a high degree of state building,
which signifies that governmental structures are in place, such as institutions necessary for a
functioning state.258 These ten institutions are listed as being present in both Northern Cyprus
and Taiwan, but Somaliland does not achieve this until 2001.259 Over a decade, they gradually
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built state institutions such as a legislature, a legal system, media, police, and even a central bank
that issues its own currency—the Somaliland shilling.260
As Kaplan notes, Somaliland’s successful state building in a time of peace presents a
direct contrast to the state of Somalia, which despite being propped up by international partners,
remained in a sorry state of affairs.261 The table below summarizes the Somaliland’s trajectory in
building a new (de facto) state.

Table 5.6: State Building in Somaliland
Degree of State Building
Low
Moderate
High

Years
1991-1992
1993-2000
2001-Present

Notably, due to Somaliland’s unrecognized status and lack of a patron, a system of
foreign affairs was the most difficult institution to set up. The international community’s taboo
on secession means that other countries are loath to not only recognize Somaliland but make
economic and diplomatic deals. Despite this, we can point to several foreign partnerships that
signify cooperation between Somaliland and the other states. In the Horn of Africa, Somaliland
has developed a relationship with neighboring Ethiopia, as well as a fiber-optic broadband link
courtesy of Djibouti.262 It cooperates with other regional and international organizations, such as
the African Union, the Arab League, the European Union, and the United Nations on facets such
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as: oil exploration licenses, repatriation of asylum seekers, counterterrorism, and infrastructure
aid.

Conclusion and Policy Implications for Somaliland
This chapter presents a summary of the case of Somaliland. As an unrecognized state,
Somaliland has indicated their preference for independence and formal recognition. Somaliland’s
experience in state building shows their ability to function as a separate entity in their own right.
They also point to a different colonial background than Somalia to justify the dissolution of the
federation.
Somaliland’s state capacity, relative to their parent state of Somalia, is higher in all
aspects. Militarily, they are able to keep the territory more secure, they have more armed
personnel, and spend a large portion of the budget on security. They have been crucial in battling
the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, as well as combatting piracy off the Somali coast. Somaliland has
been more successful in building their economy as well, compared to Somalia. While still a very
poor area, evidence indicates that authorities are doing better on collecting taxes and being
accountable to the population. Lack of foreign aid meant that Somaliland needed to improve
revenue-collecting measures to provide services to the population, security being the most
important. GDP per capita is higher than Somalia’s, and partnerships with other countries in the
Horn of Africa and the Middle East provide an indication that Somaliland’s economy is set to
improve. Following the 1991 split, Somaliland set out to build government institutions, as well
as improve their quality. Currently, they are rated as having a “high” degree of state building,
which points to the remarkable turnaround of a post-conflict de facto state, without a patron.
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The future of Somaliland’s quest for recognition is unclear, but ultimately, they have
shown to be more successful at state building than their recognized counterpart. Despite the lack
of recognition, and more surprisingly, the lack of a patron, Somaliland has proven to be a bright
spot in a region beset by multiple concerns: terrorism, piracy, and border disputes. Somaliland is
yet another example of how unrecognized states are not synonymous with instability, and that
successful state building is not tied to recognition, or even foreign assistance.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Theoretical Summary
This dissertation serves as an addition to the rich subfield of de facto states within the study
of political science. The underlying question, or puzzle, throughout this manuscript is: What
explains the variation in de facto state preferences of either reintegration, status quo, or
independence? This question merits consideration because de facto states are born of secessionist
conflict. Conflicts which were, at the core, about separating from the parent state and carving out
a new country. Why then, not push full steam ahead for independence?
I attempt to answer this question with a theory centering state capacity dynamics between the
de facto state and parent state. The theory is simple: relative state capacity shapes (although does
not determine) a de facto state’s strategy towards their sovereignty. Over time, how a de facto
state develops in relation to its home informs actions taken towards or against independence. A
de facto state with a lower relative state capacity than the parent state would have a disincentive
to push for full independence. For one, being weaker would put the unrecognized state at a
disadvantage when it came to claiming their ability to function as a recognized state. With the
power dynamics shifted toward the parent state, the incentive for the de facto state is to push for
reintegration with the parent state.
When state capacity is relatively equal between the de facto state and parent state, the
likelihood is that the de facto state will continue to embrace the status quo. While de facto
statehood and its implied unrecognition is the not the ideal strategy for a territory looking for
eventual statehood, it is sometimes the next best option. For one, it does not require a change to
the current situation, hence the status quo designation. Secondly, it is unlikely that the parent
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state will take aggressive action against the de facto state while their capabilities are evenly
matched.
When relative state capacity is in favor of the de facto state, this is when one would expect to
see de facto states pushing for independence. To be clear, this does not mean that the de facto
state will be successful in being granted statehood, but rather that they are more overt about
wanting independence. With capabilities being stronger, there is little threat from the parent
state. De facto states can point to their record of stability and stronger capabilities to push the
case for statehood.
Elaborating on the concept of state capacity, I divide it into three categories: military,
economic, and administrative. Each one corresponds to separate state functions, although this
does not mean that they do not overlap or influence one another. Military capacity refers to a
state (or de facto state’s) ability to control territory, have a monopoly on violence, and protect
against internal and external threats. Military capacity is measured in this dissertation by the
number of armed personnel, the percentage of GDP spent on military expenditure, and the total
amount spent on military expenditure. Furthermore, for de facto states, the patron state’s aid is
also used in calculating the total military capacity. Aid can come in monetary support, or in
training and soldiers.
The second facet of state capacity is economic capacity. Economic capacity refers to a state’s
ability to collect revenue from its population and use this revenue and other funds to support
state goals. In a comparative format, economic capacity is measured in a variety of ways: total
GDP, GDP per capita, tax revenue as a percentage of GDP, and income classification. While
military capacity may be vital for ensuing security of the (de facto) state, this is not possible
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without adequate funds to support the military, especially when de facto states are for the most
part not recognized.
The third part of state capacity refers to administrative capacity. Administrative capacity
measures the presence of institutions, and the quality of state building. Overall, established and
recognized states will have all typical institutions in place, while de facto states either have to
construct new institutions, or use holdovers from the parent state. This can be further exacerbated
if the secessionist conflict was recent, as there is a whole new layer of reconstruction to contend
with. Two indicators go into determining the level of administrative capacity a de facto state has:
a count of the number of state institutions, and the quality of state building from the first year of
de facto statehood. Notably, de facto states, by virtue of being unrecognized (or only recognized
by one or a handful of states) often have limited or no ability to build relationships with other
recognized states. The ability to form relationships, host embassies, and conduct trade is a state
institution. This can have repercussions for domestic institutions. For example, if a de facto state
is subject to a trade embargo by the parent state, this severely hinders their ability to sell their
products and services abroad (and this is in fact the case with Northern Cyprus). Additionally,
administrative capacity cannot simply be ameliorated by will, the de facto state needs sufficient
funds to build health system, welfare, and police, to provide a few examples. Therefore, it is
difficult to look at administrative capacity in isolation without consideration the economic
implications. This is to say, that a state or de facto state with low funds and resources is unlikely
to have robust institutions, if they are all even present at all.
With the three parts of state capacity defined, the last part of the theory concerns the
placement of military capacity. While all three, military, economic, and administrative capacity,
go in to determining the total state capacity of a de facto state, there is an assumed level of

158
military capability. In order to break off from the parent state, and successfully survive as an
unrecognized entity (often for decades) military capacity (this includes patron help) needs to be
at a sufficient level. Simply put, sufficient military capacity is the first condition that de facto
states need in order to survive. At minimum, military capacity of the de facto state and patron
will be at parity with the parent state. Essentially, it needs to be robust enough to deter an attack
or forcible reintegration by the parent state. This means that military capacity will not be lower
than the parent state. Economic and administrative capacity can be lower, equal, or higher
comparatively, but military capacity will only be equal or higher than the parent state.

Northern Cyprus
Three case studies were used to demonstrate each strategy and the differing relative
capacities possible for the de facto-parent state dynamic. The case of Northern Cyprus and the
run up to the 2004 referendum is used to show an example of lower relative state capacity to the
parent state and the reintegration approach. The case of Taiwan is used as an example of
relatively matched state capacity and subsequent status quo strategy. Somaliland is used to show
higher relative state capacity to the parent state and an example of a de facto state pursuing
reintegration.
The first case study, Northern Cyprus, lays out the Turkish Cypriot approval for reintegrating
with the Republic of Cyprus and becoming a united island once again, in the context of the 2004
referendum. This of the stark differences in quality of living between resident in the Turkish
Cypriot north and the Greek Cypriot south. The Cyprus Problem, as it has come to be known,
represents the split between the Turkish backed north of the island, and the internationally
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recognized south. Although UN presence on the island has existed since 1964, unification is no
closer to being a reality.
Noting that the case of Northern Cyprus is being examined in the run-up to the Annan Plan
referendum, the question is: why did Northern Cyprus vote overwhelmingly to reunify with the
Republic of Cyprus, noting the decades of animosity between both sides? Looking at relative
state capacity between the Turkish Cypriot north and the Greek Cypriot south, it is evident that
while military capacity favors Northern Cyprus, they are not equally matched when it comes to
economic and administrative capacity. Specifically, the economic situation in the north, coupled
with the potential EU membership in a united island, represented a once in a generation
opportunity for the Turkish Cypriots.
The military capacity balance on the divided island of Cyprus favors the north, mainly due to
Turkish presence and support on the island. Having been a presence since 1974, Turkish troops
represent a commitment to keep the de facto state of Northern Cyprus alive. When combining the
number of troops, Northern Cyprus and Turkish troop presence on the island supersedes the
number of Greek Cypriot troops. And although military expenditure is higher (in dollar amounts)
for the Republic of Cyprus, Northern Cyprus receives military aid in the form of money as well.
Economically, the north lagged far behind the south preceding the referendum on
reunification. The simplest way to explain the discrepancies in income and quality of living is to
regard to the Republic of Cyprus, a recognized state, as a developed nation. While small, this
island economy boasts world-class tourism, and a robust banking industry. The north can best be
described as a developing nation during this time period, with the gap between the two glaring.
While Northern Cyprus’s economy did have defined sectors, such as tourism and education, it
was nowhere near enough to provide a comparable standard of living to their southern neighbors.
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A glaring statistic notes that in 2003, GDP per capita was almost four times lower in the
north than in the south. While the gap closed significantly following the 2005 opening of the
border crossings (down to about twice as low), the economic situation before the Annan Plan
vote was dire. This, coupled with the enticement of being an EU member, undoubtedly played a
role in Turkish Cypriot’s support for reunification. Furthermore, nonrecognition and isolation
imposed by the Republic of Cyprus meant that all trade is routed through Turkey, thanks to an
embargo. Additionally, while Northern Cyprus has foreign missions abroad (essentially pseudo
embassies), they are still only recognized by Turkey and are not able to engage in formal
diplomacy.

Taiwan
The Taiwanese strategy of status quo emerges as a result of the relationship with the
parent state, the People’s Republic of China. While Taiwan has higher indicators in measures of
GDP per capita and income classification, China’s rise means that Taiwan is in a precarious
position in regard to their sovereignty. The current ruling party, the DPP, is more proindependence than the KMT, but nevertheless would never issue a unilateral declaration of
independence (UDI), for fear of a military escalation. Therefore, while opinions on the future of
Taiwan tend to reject unification with China, they mostly fall within a spectrum of status quo,
and to delay the inevitable independence question.
Taiwan’s existence as a somewhat unique de facto state, namely being recognized by a
handful of states, is due in large part to its relation to the patron, the United States. Unlike
Northern Cyprus, which relies on Turkey for military and economic aid, Taiwan’s patron mostly
provides military equipment, and the promise of aid in the event of a military escalation with
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China. Therefore, while China’s massive military personnel and military expenditure dwarfs
Taiwan’s, their military capacity is relatively equal for the time being. This is what allows
Taiwan to continue existing in its odd position on the world state---an economic powerhouse, a
bustling democracy, and an inkling of formal recognition.
As mentioned, Taiwan beats out China in some economic indicators, namely GDP per
capita, and income classification. Furthermore, Taiwan has all the institutions of a viable state,
including robust foreign relationships with various countries. Even in states that do not recognize
Taiwan, usually one can find their presence in the form of a representative office. Nevertheless,
the economic might of the Chinese means that Taiwan is being outspent on two fronts: military
expenditure, and a fierce derecognition campaign, where China seeks out states that recognize
Taiwan, and entices them to change their recognition to China.
Unification is a non-starter for Taiwan, and although the values of a Taiwanese society
are far removed from the mainland, seeking independence is a gamble. China has already overtly
stated that taking back Taiwan is a goal, and that they will use force if necessary. Even Taiwan’s
patron state does not formally recognize Taiwan, in consideration for the geopolitical risk that
could pose. With that, a continuation of the status quo is not only the next best option, but also
seemingly the only option that would allow the de facto state of Taiwan to continue existing in
its current form.

Somaliland
Somaliland is a story of pushing for independence, and moreover, a case where the
relative state capacity favors the de facto state. Somaliland, as the shortest-lived de facto state in
the study (a respectable 29 years) is also the only one without a patron state. Despite this,
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Somalilanders have posited that Somaliland deserves independence due to a distinct colonial
history than Somalia, as well as pointing to a frankly, much better developed state capacity. This
is made more impressive by the fact that Somaliland had to rebuild in the early 1990s following
the conflict, and that they have not been recipients of any significant foreign aid, unlike their
parent state. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, the government of Somaliland has been more
accountable to their citizens.
Because of the security concerns in the region, namely Al-Shabaab, piracy, and border
disputes, Somaliland invested heavily in security at the expense of other government functions.
This is not the say this was a bad strategy, in fact, it was likely the only way to ensure continuity
and survival of Somaliland. At one point, Somaliland was spending over half of its budget on
security, although this share did go down in the past five years. In comparison, Somalia’s
disorganized and weak military has seen little success in curbing the Al-Shabaab threat.
Economically and administratively, Somaliland struggles and is categorized as low
income. While most state institutions are present, it is only recently that Somaliland has had a
relatively high degree of state building. Minimal foreign aid to Somaliland meant the first two
decades of Somaliland’s existence were relatively scarce. Despite this, Somaliland is much more
a story of success one of failure.
Somaliland’s economy, while primarily agricultural, is beginning to incorporate more
sectors, as well as more foreign partners, primarily in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East.
New investments promise to revamp the Berbera port, Somaliland’s commercial capital. New
trade relations outside the region have the potential to expand Somaliland’s economy even more.
Just recently, Somaliland welcomed a Taiwanese delegation to Hargeisa. Both de facto states
agreed to open representative offices in their respective capitals.
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With Somaliland’s stronger state capacity, and yet untapped potential, it is no wonder
that independence is the ultimate goal. The parent state, Somalia, has international recognition,
but cannot credibly threaten Somaliland, due to its weak status. Somaliland’s unilateral
declaration of independence in 1991 did not have the same backlash as other declarations of
independence, and it still remains steadfast in its commitment to achieve international
recognition.

De Facto States and Current Events
This dissertation is written as a look back on the state capacity of de facto states and
parent states, and to which extent it impacts the strategies for sovereignty. Reintegration, status
quo, and independence are not fixed preferences, and can change over time. Current events mean
that calculations can change, and geopolitical concerns may be even more important to
precariously placed de facto states.
The 2018 Cyprus gas dispute is one such current event that threatens any hope of
reconciliation to the Cyprus problem. The dispute involves the exclusive economic zone of the
Republic of Cyprus. In 2018, the Turkish foreign minister announced the intention of the
government to carry out gas exploration in the region, which rejected a 2003 Cyprus-Egypt
maritime border demarcation. They also stated that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus had
rights to the Cypriot EEZ. It is unclear whether this dispute will drive the Turkish Cypriots closer
to Turkey, especially considering the somewhat negative perception Turkish citizens have on the
island. With Cyprus and Greece on one side, with Northern Cyprus and Turkey on the other, this
additional layer of disagreement is unlikely to pave the way for another diplomatic breakthrough
that would reunite the island.
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Taiwan of course, is still a potential hotspot for geopolitical conflict between two
superpowers: The United States and China. Various articles ring the alarm on how precarious the
situation is for the island off mainland China. China’s stated intent for Taiwan’s reintegration,
one way or another, bring up the question of U.S. commitment to the democratic territory. In the
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, China’s derecognition campaign was put into full view when
they blocked Taiwanese participation in the World Health Organization. Even the recent
Somaliland-Taiwan accord brought with it swift backlash from China. China promised to open
their own representative office in Hargeisa in exchange for Somaliland’s rejection of Taiwan.
Somaliland did not agree and affirmed their commitment to Taiwan. However, it is worth noting
that China has been far more successful in convincing Taiwanese derecognition for other states.

Next Steps
This dissertation explored state capacity dynamics of de facto states and parent states.
Moreover, it examined how these dynamics might affect steps de facto states taken towards
independence, or non-independence. Within non-independence, there are various options. This
dissertation explored two of them: reintegration with the parent state, and status quo. It examined
three cases: Northern Cyprus, Taiwan, and Somaliland.
I believe this theory of state capacity can be applied to other de facto state – parent state
dyads. For example, the case of Transnistria would provide a useful application of the theory.
While it enjoys patronage from Russia, Transnistria also benefits from a special trade agreement
with the European Union, putting it at odds with the tendency to view de facto states as isolated.
Moreso than the other post-Soviet de facto states (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and NagornoKarabakh), Transnistria has a vested interest in keeping relations with the EU favorable. Stuck
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between its patron and the European Union, the de facto state of Transnistria is likely to favor the
status quo, as it does not push it towards any one side. Moreover, the parent state Moldova, as
one of the poorest countries in Europe, presents less of a challenge. While overall economic and
administrative capacity is likely higher in Moldova, Transnistria can continue to pursue a
strategy of status quo as long as Russian troops remain in the territory.
There are various avenues for future scholarship that would advance the subfield of
unrecognized states. Further studies of state capacity for de facto states can be used to compare
them to all states, not just the parent state. This can pave the way to rank de facto states within
their region, and the world. The next question would be: How do de facto states rank compared
to other states in their region? How do they rank on a world scale? For example, how would
Somaliland have compared to other states in the Horn of Africa? Would the “success story” tale
still hold?
Another avenue of scholarship concern shifting priorities. For example, Northern Cyprus
declared independence in 1983, and had a pro-independence stance until around 2003, when the
popular opinion backed reunification. Following the collapse of the Annan Plan and the Republic
of Cyprus’s ascension into the European Union, more attempts to negotiate a bi-communal, bizonal federation ultimately failed, most recently in 2017 in Crans-Montana. Current sentiment in
Northern Cyprus has seemingly shifted to an acceptance and preference for the status quo. A
valuable question to consider would be: Under what conditions do de facto states shift
preferences for recognition?
The subfield of de facto states is a promising and exciting area for both academics and
policy makers. While the question of “Why does this matter?” is always at the forefront of both,
de facto states are an important consideration for: democratic governance, great power
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competition, increasing secessionist movements, natural resources, counterterrorism, and more.
The longevity of de facto states will come to show whether unrecognized statehood is a
transition to autonomy or independence, or if in fact, they are stable systems that can stand on
their own.
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